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The purpose of this thesis is to show how labors 
right to organize was affected by the legislation passed dur*ing 
the New Deal period. Chapter I examines the historical develop­
ment of this problem. Chapters II and III are devoted to a 
careful analysis of the legislation, the philosophy behind it, 
and the mechanics of its implimentation. The remaining portion 
of the thesis discusses the effectiveness of the legislation 
during a decade of operation and the subsequent impact of court 
interpretation.
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CHAPTER I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT
The history of the labor movement is long and complex 
To trace briefly the history of the movement with all its 
problems and intricacies would reveal nothing new or signifi­
cant. Consequently the historical background recorded in 
this chapter will be confined to only the most significant 
problems which have faced the American workingman in his 
attempts at unionization. These problems were, to be more 
precise, the overcoming of legal and economic obstacles which 
prevented the laboring man from organizing into trade unions 
for the purpose of collective bargaining. Historically bona 
fide labor unions have been organized by men who wanted to j\ 
improve their working conditions, their pay, or otherwise 
change their relationship with their employer through the 
process of collective bargaining. The history of the labor 
movement has been a study of methods used by unions and the 
attitudes that society has taken towards these methods as 
reflected by statutory and common law.
Collective bargaining is not a new concept. Simple 
forms of it can be found very early in recorded history. In 
medieval England, town charters and merchant guilds provide 
excellent examples. The townspeople, through collective 
contract, secured certain rights from the King. For these
rights, they paid him a sum of money* The most important of 
these can be found in the doctrine ,TCity air makes free,” 
which simply meant that if a serf resided in a city for a 
year, he became a free man. Xji thi^_^ay, freedom was secured 
through collective bargaining. Until freedom was obtained, 
no one could make individual contracts. Historically, then, 
individual and collective bargaining have been interdepend­
ent.^
The right to organize and bargain collectively has 
been, impinged upon in many ways by government in the United 
States. Although the President has been the chief executor 
of law passed by Congress, many governors and mayors had a
great deal of influence on public opinion and business in the
localities. They could tolerate collective bargaining and 
encourage it. They held police power and the authority to 
determine what was or was not peaceful. Police could arrest 
union members for inciting riot, disturbing the peace, or 
obstructing traffic. On the other hand, a friendly executive 
could allow a great deal of freedom to the worker in his 
union activities.
The courts were probably the most important branch 
of government so far as the law of collective bargaining was
^John R. Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles of
Labor Legislation (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 
1936), p. 379.
3concerned. Much of the law in this field was not formulated 
by legislation, but was built by court decision or common law. 
Even where a statutory law existed, the courts exerted great 
discretion in their application and interpretation of that 
law. Statutes in this area were necessarily broad, and 
general, hence it has actually been the courts1 interpre­
tations which have decided whether the law encouraged collec- 
tive bargaining or discouraged it.
For many years labor organizations were considered 
conspiracies in restraint of trade, and therefore illegal.
This view naturally made it very nearly impossible to use the 
collective bargaining process. That was the first great 
challenge which organized labor had to meet. Labor organiza­
tions which used collective bargaining were considered danger­
ous because they exerted more power than individuals bargain­
ing for themselves. Collective bargaining also meant inter­
ference with the free bargaining of individuals, both members 
and nonmembers of the organization.
In order to thoroughly understand the problem, it 
must be remembered that the doctrine of conspiracy had broad 
application, and was not applicable to labor combinations 
alone. A conspiracy, generally defined, was the combination 
of two or more persons who scheme to impair the rights of
2 .
Ibid., p. 377.
others or of society. In this category would fall for example 
the plot of a group of people who conspire to bring about the 
conviction of an innocent person or a plot to overthrow an 
established government. Before conspiracy would be charged, 
there had to be shown that the group had caused or would 
cause an injustice to other people or to society. An interest 
ing characteristic of the conspiracy doctrine was that con­
spirators could be indicted and found guilty before they had 
committed the act. For example, it was a crime to plot the 
murder of a person even though the plan was not executed. 
Another feature of importance about the doctrine was that an 
action by one person, although legal, could become illegal 
when carried out by a group. One judge stated it succinctly 
when he said: "A combination of men is a very serious matter.
No man can stand up against a combination; he may success­
fully defend himself against a single adversary, but when his
3
foes are combined and numerous, he must fall."
American courts in the early nineteenth century 
placed great emphasis on the fact that labor organizations 
were considered conspiracies, when taking action to increase 
their wages, by the English courts. The prosecution urged 
that English law established a precedent for American courts. 
In other words, the American courts should be bound by the
^People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Crim. 403 (1886).
5doctrines and laws of England. It was conceded, however, that 
workers had the right as individuals to take action to increase 
their wages. Individual bargaining for higher wages, even 
individual quitting of work becausedissatisfaction with 
working conditions, was legal. The charge was that the com­
bining of workers to force higher wages constituted illegal 
conduct.^ This doctrine, however, made some sense in England 
because they had a statute which set a wage limit; hence, when 
a union tried to use concerted action to increase their wages, 
they were technically trying to accomplish an illegal objec­
tive.
The British view was adopted for the first time by
an American court in 1806 in the case of Commonwealth v.
Cordwainers. In this case the defendants were charged with
the following counts:
Cl) The defendants, on the 1st day of November,
1805, with force and arms did combine, conspire, 
and agree to increase and augment the prices and 
rates usually paid and allowed to them... and 
unjustly to exact and procure great sums of money 
for their work and labor... to the damage, injury 
and prejudice of the masters employing them...
(2) ... the defendants endeavored to prevent by 
threats, menaces, and other unlawful means...
A ,
Fred Witney, Government and Collective Bargaining 
(Chicago: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1951), p. 27.
^Commonwealth v. Cordwainers, Commonwealth v. Pullis 
(1806), as reported in John R. Commons and Eugene A. Gilmore, 
A Documentary History of American Industrial Society (New 
York: Russell and Russell, 1958), V. 3, pp. 61-247.
other workmen and journeymen in their occupation 
from working except at certain large prices, and 
rates set by them for. their future work, to the 
great damage and prejudice of others*., to the 
evil example of others, and against the peace 
and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The judge, in his directions to the jury, backed the 
prosecution charges but indicated that the verdict would not 
impair the right of an individual to bargain with his employer,. 
The jury found the defendants guilty as charged, and so for the 
first time in America the doctrine of conspiracy was accepted 
by an American court .
Other state courts made similar decisions. During 
the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, there were nine­
teen cases (in the States of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachu­
setts, New York, and Pennsylvania) in which workers1 organiza- 
tions were prosecuted on such conspiracy charges. One of
o
the best known cases of this type was the People v. Fisher.
In most of these cases, penalties, when assessed, were 
in the form of fines although imprisonment was also provided 
by law. In passing sentence, the judge usually threatened the 
more serious penalty for second offenders. The effect was, of 
course, to discourage union activities.
Elias Lieberman, Unions Before the Bar (New York: 
Harper Brothers, 1950), p. 13.
7
Ibid., p. 15.
^People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 28 Am D 501.
The argument the employers used in condemning the 
practice of organizing for the purpose of collective bargain­
ing was classical in character. Control of wages by unions, 
it was argued, was an unnatural, artificial method of raising 
the price of work beyond its natural level, and took advan­
tage of the public. It was contended that the increase of 
wages by union pressure lead to higher prices of commodities. 
This in turn resulted in reduction of demand for the products 
causing unemployment in the community. Therefore the effect 
of the union pressure was to cause injury to the community, 
damage commerce and trade, and harm the cause of all workers.
The first major concession to organized labor in the 
United States came in 1842 in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt. 
In this case the Massachusetts court convicted seven members 
of the Boston Journeymen Bootmakers * Society for organizing a 
strike against an employer who had hired Jeremiah Horne, who 
was not a member of the society. This was in effect an attempt 
by the workers to establish a closed shop. The charge against 
the seven members was one of conspiring together to prevent the 
employer from pursuing his trade. After hearing the case, the 
trial judge instructed the jury that the indictment described 
a course of conduct amounting to criminal conspiracy. This 
meant that if such acts were proven at the trial, a verdict of 
guilty would have to follow. The workers were convicted and 
they appealed their case to the highest court in the State.
Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court overthrew the lower court ruling. In his decision,,
Justice Shaw defined conspiracy as follows: ”A conspiracy is
. ^
a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action, 
to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accom­
plish some purpose, not in itself unlawful, by criminal or 
unlawful means.’1 Justice Shaw could find no statutes for­
bidding the raising of wages so he held that there was no con­
spiracy involved. He also ruled that even a combination which 
struck to maintain a closed shop was not illegal.^"0 This 
decision has been referred to many times by liberal judges as 
a precedent for holding that workers have the legal right to 
combine into trade unions and to bargain collectively, even 
for the closed shop, with the strike as their tool. By the 
middle of the Nineteenth Century, American courts had generally 
abandoned the idea that workers were guilty of criminal con­
spiracy merely because they combined and struck for higher 
wages. The decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt was one of the 
most important in the evolution of union rights in the United 
States. In discussing this case, Charles Gregory said: ”...
this decision, issued by perhaps the most able state judge of 
his time, gave the doctrine of criminal conspiracy a consider­
able setback. .. Common law criminal conspiracy has never
o
Commonwealth v . Hunt, 4 Metcalf, 45, Mass. Ill (1842). 
l0Ibid.
again played a prominent part in the control of labor unions
11by Amerxcan courts.. .**
Another important development in the common law of 
England was the doctrine of restraint of trade. As in the 
case of the doctrine of conspiracy, it also became a part of 
the common law of the United States. The origin of this 
doctrine was found in the basic idea of common law that cer­
tain types of contracts and agreements were illegal if they 
tended to restrain trade or created a monopoly. It was 
thought unwise to allow parties to enter into contracts that 
would prevent free competition. This concept of restraint of 
trade was not applied, however, to labor organizations until 
after the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890.
The Sherman Act was exceedingly simple in statement. 
The gist of the act appeared in its first two sections, which 
read, in part, as follows:
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby de­
clared to be illegal. Every person who shall make 
any such contract or engage in any such combina­
tion or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor,...
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize
^Charles 0. Gregory. Labor and the Law (New York, 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1949), p. 29.
any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,.. . ^-2
The federal courts were given the authority to enforce 
this act, and the Attorney General was empowered to initiate 
criminal prosecutions or to secure injunctive relief against 
violations. All persons injured by violations of others were 
allowed to press civil suits for triple damages against those 
who violated the act.
Although the two sedtions quoted above appear to be 
quite simple and exact, the subsequent problem of court inter­
pretation of the phrases ,T...in restraint of commerce...,n 
and ,f...to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce,” did 
not substantiate this assumption. Justice Holmes was said to 
have thought those two sections so general in their coverage 
that they amounted to little more than a congressional direc­
tion to the federal courts nto do right" by the consuming
13public in protecting it from big enterprise.
One of the most heated controversies of that time was  ^
whether or not Congress intended the Sherman Act to cover the 
activities of organized labor. After all, the courts at one 
time had treated labor unions as restraints of trade. The
•^ United States Statutes at Large, 51st Congress, 
Session 1, May 16, 1890.
13
Gregory, op. ext., pp. 201-2.
1 1
courts themselves, however, had by 1890 come to accept labor 
unionism as an established social institution and had practi- 
cally ceased to regard the purely bargaining functions of 
unions as restraints of trade. In the key sections of the 
act there was no mention of labor unions. But just as impor­
tant was the fact that the act did not specifically exclude 
unions. The question was whether the words "combination" or 
"person" referred to unions as well as to business enter­
prises. Much has been written on this controversy. There is
14evidence to support both arguments. In any event, at the
time of its passage few people thought that it applied to 
15labor unions . and for the first eighteen years the act was
3.6in force it was not applied to them.
Shortly after the passage of the act, however, lower 
courts applied it to labor disputes; by 1900 the American
Federation of Labor sought legislation, exempting unions from
.. . 17its provisions.
14Edward Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1930).
A. T. Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1925). Professor Berman concluded that 
Congress did not intend to inelude labor unions within the 
scope of the legislation while Professor Mason held the oppo­
site opinion.
15Commons and Andrews , jop. cit., p. 385.
^Gregory, op. cit., p. 206.
17 .Commons and Andrews, op. cit*, p. 385.
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The first case involving labor and the Sherman Act to 
reach the Supreme Court was the famous Danbury Hatters* case 
of 1908* A nationally affiliated union of hat workers was 
attempting to organize all the workers of the eighty or more 
large felt hat manufacturers in the nation. Most of them were 
already orgaa ized. A few manufacturers were strong enough to 
resist the union and this proved to be quite embarrassing to 
the union because the non-union plants were able to sell their 
products at a lower price due to the lower wages paid to their 
employees. The 'union was unsuccessful in attempting to organ­
ize Loew*s Hat Company by local strikes in Danbury, Connecti­
cut* As a result of this failure, the union imposed a nation­
wide secondary boycott on the company. All members of the 
American Federation of Labor were urged to stop buying these 
hats and to stop patronizing shops thich sold them. Loew’s 
suffered substantial losses, and under the appropriate provi­
sion of the Sherman Act brought civil suit against the 
individual membership of the union for triple damages and 
secured a judgment of over a quarter million dollars. The 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court which sustained the 
lower court *s decision.
It was the opinion of the court that the act "pro­
hibited any combination whatever to secure action that
■j Q
Loew v. Lawlor, 208 TJ. . S. (1908).
13
essentially obstructed the free flow of commerce among the
states or restricted the liberty of an individual to engage 
19in business.M The court also pointed out that the combi­
nation was in that class of restraints of trade which was 
illegal under common law.
The Danbury Hatters doctrine had serious effects on 
the labor union movement. The case stimulated additional 
prosecution of labor unions under the Sherman Law. Since the 
Supreme Court held that the law applied to unions, employers 
were endowed with a potent weapon with which to combat trade 
unions. In addition, the decision established the principle 
that individual members are responsible for actions of their 
officers. Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion of the court, 
declared that since "members paid their dues and continued to 
delegate authority to their officers unlawfully to interfere 
with the plaintiffs* interstate commerce in such circumstances 
that they knew or ought to have known, and such officers were 
in the belief that they were acting in the matters within
their delegated authority, then such members were jointly 
20liable...*' The practical significance of this decision was 
that the rank and file members as well as the union officers 
were liable for the payment of the judgment.
19 Ibid.
2®Lawlor v. Loew, 235 U. S. 522 (1915).
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The Danbury Hatters decision also had the effect of 
outlawing the secondary boycott since it was this activity by 
the union which caused the suit* This was a serious loss of 
power for organized labor at a time when they could ill afford 
it* Placing unions under the antitrust laws, making the indi­
vidual union member responsible for damages, outlawing the use 
of the secondary boycott, all had the effect of drastically 
weakening union power.
In conjunction with the doctrine of restraint of 
commerce was the use of the injunction. An injunction is a 
judicial order commanding a person or persons not to do a par­
ticular thing. It was designed primarily for the protection 
21of property. In the 1880*s the use of it against labor organ­
izations was established and almost any employer opposing any
action by a labor union was able to secure an injunction or a
22temporary restraining order. Unless the organization or
persons wanted to pay contempt fines, they were obliged to
obey the order. The injunction placed the labor unions in a
unique position for, as Felix Frankfurter wrote:
In labor cases, the injunction cannot preserve 
the so-called status quo. The situation does not 
remain in an equilibrium, awaiting judgment upon 
full knowledge. The suspension of activities 
affects only the strikers; the employer resumes 
his efforts to defeat the strike and resumes them,
21Edwin E. Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932X7 p. 33.
22Gregory, op. cit., pp. 99-101.
15
free from the interdicted interferences. More­
over, the suspension of the strike activities, 
even temporarily, may defeat the strike for 
practical purposes, and foredoom its resumption, 
even if the injunction is later lifted.23
The injunction was found to be quite an effective
device by many employers; all that was necessary to initiate
an order was an affidavit swearing that the strike, boycott,
or other action being used by the labor organization would
24result in irreparable damage to property* In many cases,
this could not be objected to, if, for instance, there had
been actual physical damage done to the plant or building,
such as windows broken or doors smashed. But many employers
claimed and many judges agreed that property was more than
this. They claimed the word "property” implied the right to
carry on business without interference; in some cases this
would rule out the primary boycott, the secondary boycott,
and picketing.
All judges did not take this view on property.
Oliver Wendell Holmes said:
By calling business property, you make it 
seem like land.... An established business, no 
doubt, may have pecuniary value and commonly is 
protected by law against various unjustified
23George P. Shultz and John R. Coleman, Labor Problems, 
Cases and Readings (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1953), 
p . 366
^Gregory, o£. cit ., p . 97.
injuries. But you cannot give it definitive­
ness of contour by calling it a thing. It is 
a course of conduct and like other conduct, is 
subject to substantial modification, according 
to time and circumstance, both in itself and in 
regard to what shall justify doing it a harm. 5
The injunction was also used to enforce the so-called
nyellow dog” contracts which many employers forced prospective
employees to sign. In the contract was the promise not to
join a particular union or perhaps any union whatsoever*
These contracts had little legal significance because at that
time an employer could discharge any employee for any reason,
hence it was used for its psychological effect. The courts
also held that such contracts could be used as ground to
Issue sweeping injunctions against any kind of "persuasion”
of workers to join unions. The legal reasoning was that
"persuasion” under such circumstances was inducing the worker
to break a contract, and this action was a legal wrong against
which the employer was entitled to injunctive relief. This
26reasoning was upheld by the Supreme Court.
So far, only legal questions have been considered, but 
actually of more importance than the legal barricades obstruct­
ing the employee from exercising his right to organize was the 
intangible economic weapons held and used by the employer.
2^Ibid., p. 98.
Hltchman Coal and Coke Co., v. MitcheJLl, 2 U. S.
229 (1917).
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The employer had certain rights that were used to thwart
labor organizations and which were upheld by law prior to the
enactment of the New Deal labor legislation. The rights of
employers in dealing with their employees were as follows:
(1> Employers had the right to form employers’ asso-
27ciations. This was unquestioned in the courts. Individual 
employers could refuse to make trade agreements with unions 
and through their organizations they could make legally bind­
ing agreements to operate under an open shop plan. They were 
able to bind themselves with penalties not to deal with labor 
unions, and such penalties were enforceable at law and through 
injunctions.^ In addition to this, it was held by the West
Virginia State Courts that unions could not combine to prevent
29employers from belonging to employers * associations.
(2) In addition, employers had the right to ,Tlock 
out” their employees; this right was considered the counter­
part of the strike and was not questioned by the courts.
(3) The right of the employer to operate his plant 
during a strike was also unquestioned as was his right to 
police protection. In some states, the law required, however, 
that in advertising for labor during a strike, the strike had
0 7
Commons and Andrews, oj>. cit. , p. 403 
28Ibid., p . 404 29Ibid.
to be mentioned. To protect the strike breakers, the
employers might hire strike guards. Thus did the employer
not only have the right to defeat strikes but to defeat
organizational strikes which prevented the growth of labor
organizations among their employees.
(4) One of the most effective and most frequently
used methods of preventing organization was the right of the
employer to discriminate against union workers. He could
refuse to hire a union member or even a former member and he
could discriminate against him in any number of ways such as
work arrangements or pay adjustments. Legislation to restrict
the employer from discharging a worker for joining a union was
passed in eight states by the turn of the century (Illinois,
Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Indiana, Missouri,
and Wisconsin), but in at least six of these states the laws
32were declared unconstitutional. In 1898 Congress attempted
to limit this right as it applied to the railroad workers
when it passed the Erdman Act, but this too was declared
unconstitutional because it was in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The Supreme Court stated:
...the right of a person to sell his labor upon 
such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, 
the same as the right of the purchaser of labor
31Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 405
to prescribe the conditions upon which he will 
accept such labor from the person offering to 
sell it. So the right of the employee to quit 
the service of the employer, for whatever reason, 
is the same as the right of the employer, for 
whatever reason, to dispense with the services 
of the employee...
(5) Since the employers absolute right to dismiss
an employee was not denied, the result was the virtual
legalization of the black list. Although most states had
laws which outlawed the circulation of lists of union members
it was not illegal to act on such information by refusing to
hire an individual. The employer's reason for refusing to
employ or for discharging an employee could not be questioned 
3 4
in any court. In actual practice, it was almost impossible 
to enforce these laws since supplying of such information by 
former employers upon request of a potential or present 
employee was considered privileged at law; consequently, if 
the employee was discharged as a result of this information, 
he had no legal recourse unless the employer who discharged 
him would divulge his source of information. The latter, of 
course, did not occur.
(6) It was also considered the undisputed right of 
the employer to organize company unions. A company union is 
one which was organized and run by the employer and was found
33Adair v. U. S., 208 U. 5. 161 (1908).
34
Commons and Andrews, op. cit., p. 408.
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to be an effective way of preventing the growth of a trade 
union. A company dominated, union or an employee representa­
tive plan by its very nature cannot be a successful collec­
tive bargaining unit because of the influence which is brought 
to bear by the employer. Nevertheless, company dominated 
unions grew very rapidly in the decade following the first 
World War, and this type of organization proved to be a suc­
cessful method of slowing down the organization of trade 
unions.
Therefore there were three main problems facing the 
labor unions in the first decade of this century. The first 
was the continued use of the anti-trust acts against them for 
restraint of trade, as exemplified in the Danbury Hatters 
Case; the second was the use of the injunction, which included 
the rigid interpretation of the word-"property;” and the third 
was the economic coercion used by the employers.
The American Federation of Labor considered it impera­
tive to seek legislative relief from such restrictions. Pro­
tection of the right to organize, to bargain collectively, to 
strike, to boycott, and to picket had become a vital concern. 
The first step in attempting to exert more effective political 
pressure in support of such aims were made in 1906 when the 
American Federation of Labor submitted a bill of grievances to 
the President and to Congress. Two of the most important de­
mands were for exemption of labor unions from the Sherman Act
2 1
and relief from injunctions which were said to represent a 
judicial use of power properly belonging to the legislature.
Congress ignored 'labor’s appeal, and the bills that 
the unions tried to introduce were pushed aside. When the 
American Federation of Labor consequently entered actively 
into the congressional campaign of 1906, it not only called 
for the support of all congressional candidates favorable to 
labor, but where neither party had named a favorable candi­
date, it recommended the nomination of a trade unionist. Two 
years later, in 1908, Gompers called upon both party conven­
tions for support. While the Republicans completely ignored 
the appeal, the Democrats adopted an anti-injunction plank in 
their platform. Nothing was accomplished in this area for 
the next six years, although the Democratic House chosen in 
1910 gave hope of a more favorable attitude towards labor.
An effective eight hour day for workers on public contracts 
was finally passed, an Industrial Relations Coaimission was 
established, and provisions were made for the creation of a 
Department of Labor designed to promote the workers1 welfare. 
But it was not until the election of 1912 that a real turning 
point was reached so far as significant labor legislation was 
concerned.
In President Wilson’s inaugural address, he emphasized 
the need for legislation which would safeguard the workers' 
lives, improve their working conditions, and provide them
2 2
" 3 5“freedom to act in their own interest.” He denied that such 
laws could be considered class legislation and claimed that 
they were in the interest of the whole people.
The results of Wilson*s program were quite substan­
tial. He won legislative support for the La Follette Seamen’s 
Act in 1915, which corrected some of the glaring abuses in the 
employment of sailors. The Adamson Act established an eight- 
hour day, with time and a half for overtime, for all employees 
of railways. More controversial, although desired by labor, 
was the Congressional enactment of a literacy test for all 
European immigrants which was the first step toward the policy 
of immigration restriction long demanded by labor. Desirable 
as this legislation was, labor longed for more, and in 1914 
Congress finally passed the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, including
within it too sections which labor believed to be relief from
36
the Sherman Act and the injunction. To labor, this more
than fulfilled the Democratic promise of 1912 which stated
that ’’labor organizations and their members should not be
37regarded as illegal organizations in restraint of trade.
35Documents of American History, ed. Henry Steele 
Commager (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), 
pp. 262-3.
^Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company), pp. 197-207.
37
Survey, July 4, 1914, Vol. 32, p. 360.
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Specifically, Section 6 of the Clayton Act declared
that f,the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce," and that nothing in the anti-trust laws should
be construed to forbid the existence of unions, preventing
them from "lawfully" carrying out their legitimate objects,
or hold them "to be illegal combinations," or "conspiracies
in restraint of trade.""5®
Section 20 outlawed the use of injunctions in all
disputes between employers and employees "unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property
right... for which injury there is no adequate remedy at 
3 9
law." This appeared to free labor from the injunction when 
engaging in such activities as strikes, the secondary boycott, 
and picketing.^
Organized labor felt it had won a victory. Samuel 
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor and 
chief spokesman for labor, referred to the act as "the indus­
trial Magna Charta upon which the working people will rear
41
their construction of industrial freedom."
^®United States Statutes at Large, 63rd Congress, 
Session I, May 30, 1914.
^ G r egory, b£. cit., p . 163
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If Gorapers was over-optimistic, there were others who 
foresaw the weaknesses of the law. In an editorial in The 
Nation, it was observed:
Labor unions may not be enjoined from lawfully 
carrying out the legitimate objects therof 
That leaves the whole question undecided, or 
rather, throws it back to the courts, with their 
previous decisions as to what may and may not be 
done lawfully*42
The weakening of Sections 6 and 20 was attained by the 
Supreme Court decision in the case of Duplex Printing Press 
Company v. Peering which was finally decided in 1921 after 
almost six years of litigation in the courts. ^
In this case, an international mechanics* union had 
attempted to unionize a non-union printing press company, 
the only company in the industry which was not organized. The 
pressure used by the union was not the strike but the secon­
dary boycott--members of the union refusing to repair or to 
work on this company’s presses where they were installed or 
to work for anyone who used them.
The Duplex Company in a suit for injunctive relief 
under the Sherman Act sought to stop this organized pressure. 
The union relied on Section 20 of the Clayton Act as a defense, 
arguing that its terms covered this situation. The Supreme
^ T h e  Nation, October 15, 1914, V. 99, pp. 456-7.
43 . .
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U. S
443 (1921).
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Court ruled that Section 20 applied only in cases where the 
relationship of employment existed between the company and the 
union members involved. In other words, the secondary boycott 
was not legalized and so the injunction could be used*
By pointing out the frequency of use by Congress of 
the words "lawfully" and "peaceably," the court said that it 
was the intent of Congress to carry on the old interpretations 
of the court as to what was peaceful and legal. The courts, 
however, had proved to have a very narrow view concerning the 
activities of labor. As an example, in several cases the 
courts had ruled that there was no such thing as "peaceful" 
picketing; that is to say, they had declared the very act of 
picketing to be illegal.^ Another example of the narrow view 
that the courts took toward labor activities was the inter­
pretation which made the secondary boycott, picketing, and 
certain strikes illegal because they were interfering with the 
"property rights" of business.
The net result of the Duplex case was that the Supreme 
Court through its interpretation placed the whole question of 
what was "peaceful" or "lawful" activity of labor back into 
the hands of the courts. The courts, basing their new de­
cisions on the old interpretations of what was "peaceful" or 
"lawful" could still use the injunction. The activities,
AA , ■
Gregory, op. cit., p. 165.
26
which were presumably made legal in Section 6, were not legal
if the court in some previous decision ruled that they were
not. The only conclusion which can be drawn, after a close
examination of the decision, is that the Clayton Act did not
change the law affecting labor unions or their activities in
any appreciable way.
A number of later United States Supreme Court
decisions completed the destruction of the Clayton Act. For
example, in the American Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council case, the court handed down a rigid definition
of peaceful picketing. This definition was not thought fair
by labor unions who branded this type of picketing "Pink Tea 
4 5
Picketing."
In the case of Truax v. Corrigan, any hope of legal 
relief for labor was even more effectively killed. Arizona 
had passed a law that sought to do away altogether with injunc­
tions in labor disputes, and the Supreme Court in effect de­
clared it unconstitutional. By preventing an employer from 
obtaining an injunction, it was stated, the State took away
his means of securing protection and thereby "deprived him of
46property without due process of law."
With such encouragement from the courts, employers 
resorted to injunctions even more frequently than in the days
45Ibid.. p. 172.
46
Truax v. Corrigan, 257, U. S. 312 (1921).
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before the passage of the Clayton Act. In 1928, the American 
Federation of Labor submitted a list of 389 injunctions that 
had been granted by either Federal or State courts in the pre­
ceding decade, and this list was incomplete because of a large
47
number that were not recorded in the lower courts.
In 1932, just before the advent of the New Deal, the 
Norris-La Guardia Bill was passed. This act was important for 
several reasons. First of all, the encouragement of collec­
tive bargaining was made a public policy of the Federal Govern 
ment. It stated that: .
Whereas, under prevailing economic conditions, 
developed with the aid of governmental authority, 
for owners of property to organize in the corporate 
and other forms of ownership association, the indi­
vidual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to 
exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect 
his freedom of labor, and therby obtain acceptable 
terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, 
although he should be free to decline to associate 
with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full 
freedom of association, self organization, and 
designation of representatives of his own choosing 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment, 
and that he should be free from the interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or 
their agents, in the designation of such representa­
tives or in self-organizations or in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection...48
No machinery was provided, however, to prevent employ­
ers from interfering with this right, but it was a beginning.
^Gregory, o£. cit., p. 174.
48Unxted States Statutes at Large, 72nd Congress, 
Session I, June 1, 1932.
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It also greatly limited the use of the injunction and in
reality did away with the ."yellow-dog*1 contract by making it
4 9
non-enjoinable in the courts.
Congress had as early as 1898 attempted to regulate 
the use of this kind of contract when it enacted the Erdman 
Act. This act confined itself to the railroad industry, which 
was considered within the legitimate jurisdiction of the 
Federal government because of its interstate character, long 
before any other. The purpose of this law was to promote 
interstate commerce. In accomplishing this purpose, pro­
cedures were to be established designated to reduce labor con­
flict in theination’s railroads. Though the law provided for 
the mediation and arbitration of labor disputes, the concern 
here is with its provisions which protected the rights of 
railroad workers to organize and bargain collectively. The 
Erman Act in part resulted from the famous Pullman strike of 
1894. Fundamentally this strike was caused by the refusal of 
the Pullman Company to respect the right of workers to bargain 
collectively. Congress was aware that organization strikes 
could again interrupt railroad traffic among the states. Such 
strikes could, result from the demand by the railroads that 
workers live up to "yellow dog" contracts, and the discharge 
of workers because of union activities. Congress reasoned
4 9Commons and Andrews, op. cit., p. 421.
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that if these two anti-union practices could be eliminated 
the necessity for organizational strikes in the railroad 
industry would be reduced. As a;result of these considera­
tions, Section 10 was included which stated that it was a 
misdemeanor for railroad employers to require employees to 
sign a rryellow dog" contract or to discharge or threaten to 
discharge an employee for joining a union.
The Erdman Act suffered a fatal blow from the Supreme
Court in 1908. The court found this provision of the Erdman
Act to be unconstitutional as an invasion of both personal
50liberty and the rights of property. A comparable state law 
was outlawed in the case of Coppage v. Kansas in 1915.51
Thus, the third of a century preceeding the advent of 
the New Deal was a period in which a number of ineffectual 
steps were taken by the government in an effort to help labor 
achieve an equal bargaining position to that of industry. The 
Clayton Act attempted to free organized labor from the injunc­
tion and the anti-trust laws. Because of the conservative 
nature of the Supreme Court, this failed. The Erdman Act was 
designed to free railway employees from the fear of losing 
their jobs because of union affiliation and this also failed, 
due to the interpretation of the courts.
50
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908). 
^Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U . S .  1 (1915).
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The only hopeful sign subsequent to the New Deal was 
the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act which limited the 
use of the injunction against labor unions and in effect did 
away with the "yellow dog" contract. Thus upon the dawn of 
the New Deal, organized labor still had a number of problems 
to solve. The most pressing of these was the employers use 
of his economic power to hire, fire, organize company unions, 
and coerce his employees. These were the problems that 
Congress would have to solve in the decade of the New Deal.
CHAPTER II
NEW DEAL LEGISLATION
By the time Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 
it was apparent that the labor movement was not satisfied with 
the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act. While grateful 
for the progress made by the act, labor felt additional legis­
lation was needed. During the next three years, Congress 
enacted three pieces of legislation which largely satisfied 
the demands of organized labor. This legislation included 
Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Public 
Resolution Number 44, and the National Labor Relations Act.
Organized labor felt that legislation in addition to 
the Norris-La Guardia Act was needed because of two fundamental 
problems. The first was most easily understood; there was a 
surplus of workers as unemployment was at an all time high.
The law of supply and demand made it clear that it was an 
employer's market. If an employee agitated for organization 
of a union or if he was a union member, any action taken by 
his union could endanger his job. Secondly, many employers 
promoted company unions when they feared the danger of a trade 
union movement within their own company. The company union 
differed from the bonafide trade union in that it was dominated 
by the employer who often wrote its constitution or by-laws,
32
attended its meetings, and paid its expenses. Although, the 
growth of the company union was rapid during this period, its 
origin was much earlier.
In 1918, the National War Labor Board was created to 
act in labor management controversies which might interfere 
with war production. This Board was an agency of voluntary 
conciliation and arbitration without coercive powers other than 
the force that its opinion might have on public opinion. The 
War Labor Conference Board, upon whose recommendation the 
National War Labor Board was established, had previously indi­
cated that the work of the National War Labor Board should be 
based on two principles; (1) that the working man should have 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, and (2) that 
employers had the duty to refrain from interfering with trade 
unions or find a suitable substitute measure. The company 
union became this substitute. The National War Labor Board, 
however, promptly condemned the use of a company union as a 
device to avoid the duty of genuine collective bargaining, aid 
in a series of rulings asserted labor's right to be free of 
such a hindrance, by issuing an official governmental state­
ment of sympathy with laborfs right to bargain collectively.
The Board sai d :
The right of workers to organize in trade 
unions and to bargain collectively through chosen 
representatives Is recognized.and affirmed. The 
right shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered
33
with by the employers in any maneuver what­
soever.... Employers should not discharge workers 
for membership in trade, unions nor for legitimate 
trade union acitivties.
With the close of World War I, governmental interest 
in this problem faded. Although the company union declined in 
some quarters, it flourished in others. Employers, realizing 
that the habit of organization was a force with which they 
must deal, extended the use of the company union. It was esti­
mated that while in 1919 only 403,765 workers were members of 
company unions, by the year 1922 the number had increased to
690,000. By 1926 the membership had grown to more than two
2
million wage earners.
Employers often positively refused to recognize and 
deal with bonafide trade unions, and utilized the company 
union to divert any organizational drive. An example of this 
is seen in an incident which occurred in the Ames Baldwin 
Wyoming Company in West Virginia in September, 1933, when 
several employees attempted to organize a union. The union 
had requested recognition and seniority rights. On June 25, 
1934, the power in the plant was discontinued, and all employ­
ees were required to attend a meeting called by the president
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National War Labor Board, 
Bulletin 287, (1922).
2
American Federation of Labor, Report of Proceedings 
of the Forty-Sixth Annual Convention, (1926), p. 290.
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of the company, Richard Harte. Harte stated that under law 
he could not recognize unions that did not represent 100 per 
cent of the employees, and would not recognize them in any 
event. He set forth the following alternatives to union 
recognition; (1) shut down the plant, (2) tear down the plant, 
or (3) move away. He pointed out the benefits provided by 
company unions, and requested that a vote be taken to indicate 
whether the workers were for or against the company plan. The 
men voted with little or no secrecy, and a company official 
counted the ballots. The exact tabulation was not announced; 
however, a statement was issued stating that the company plan 
had attracted eighty per cent of the vote. Consequently, the 
constitution which had been written by company lawyers was 
considered ratified by this vote, although no opportunity to 
vote on its acceptance or rejection had been given. In addi­
tion, the constitution made the union a close shop plan.5 As 
in many cases when a company union had been organized, sub­
stantial wage increases were given, exemplifying the idea that
the company union could accomplish what other trade unions 
4could not.
Committee on Labor and Education, Hearings on National 
Labor Relations Board, United States Senate, 74th Congress, 
First Session, part 1, p. 170.
4Ibifl., p. 167.
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Xn 1919 the National Association of Manufacturers gave 
its official endorsement to company unionism in a statement 
that read in part:
The widening movement for the open shop is 
stimulated by the extension of plans for indus­
trial representation which are being rapidly 
introduced not only in manufacturing establish­
ments, but in other industrial organizations.
A  firm foothold has been obtained by the indus­
trial representation idea. If plans for its 
adoption are wisely introduced, representation 
should become the most approved method of deal­
ing with labor.5
Organized labor, however, objected to the use of \ 
company unions, and were united in their belief that it was \ 
not an instrument of collective bargaining, but rather of \ 
compromise and conciliation at best and merely represented \ 
a method of company domination of workers. In 1919 the —  
American Federation of Labor condemned the company union in 
the following terms:
In establishing wages, hours, and working con­
ditions in their plant, employers habitually used 
their great economic power to enforce their will. 
Therefore, to secure just treatment, the only 
recourse of the workers is to develop a power 
equally strong and to confront their employers 
with it.... In this vital respect, the company 
union is a complete failure. With hardly a pre­
tense of organization, unaffiliated with other 
groups of workers in the same industry, destitute
National Association of Manufacturers, Proceedings 
of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Convention, (1921) , p. 21.
of funds, and unfitted to use the strike weapon, 
it is totally unable to force its will...,6
The company union was not the only method used by 
business to thwart the development of bonafide unions. Cer­
tain economic weapons used in conjunction with propaganda 
techniques proved to be quite effective. Certain of the more 
sophisticated industries used what was later called "The 
Mohawk Valley Formula.11 This formula became so effective in 
breaking organizational strikes that it was circulated to the 
members of the National Association of Manufacturers. Though 
used for years in more or less complete form, it was not cir­
culated until after 1936. The formula was written by James 
H. Rand, 'Jr., President of Remington Rand. He utilized it 
successfully to defeat attempts of organization in his plant 
in 1936. After the plant broke a strike in the Ilion, New 
York, plant of Remington Rand, Mr. Rand boasted: "Two million
business men have been looking for a formula like this and
business has hoped for, dreamed of, and prayed for such an 
7 '
example...." Although the plan was not invented by Mr. Rand, 
he certainly formulized, popularized, and published it.
^American Federation of Labor, Report of Proceedings, 
Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention, (1919), p. 303.
7
Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations
Board, Vol. XI, p. 664.
This formula blueprinted a systematic campaign to de­
nounce all union organizers as dangerous agitators, align the 
community in support of employers in the name of law and order 
intimidate strikers by mobilizing the local police to break up 
meetings, instigate "back to work1’ movements by secretly organ 
izing "loyal employees," and set up vigilance committees for 
protection in getting a plant on strike in operation again.
The underlying purpose behind the Mohawk Valley Formula was to 
win public support by branding union leaders as subversive and 
threatening to remove the affected industry from the community 
if local business interests stood by and allowed radical agi­
tators to win control over workers otherwise ready and anxious 
to cooperate with their employers* The formula indicates the 
cynicism shown by some employers in their efforts to discour­
age labor organization. It also gives a clearer picture of
8
what the unions faced in their organizational attempts.
Almost every New Deal attempt at recovery had one com­
mon theme to increase the purchasing power of the people. The 
New Deal aimed to promote economic recovery by bolstering the 
demand for goods. Public works were instituted and, in keeping 
with the objectives of increasing purchasing power, these pro­
jects were financed by government borrowing. An important 
part of this scheme was the increase of workers' wages. If
o
See Appendix.
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wages could be increased, workers would have more money to 
spend. Increase of spending would stimulate employment and, 
in turn, promote economic recovery *
These New Deal principles were contained in the Nation­
al Industrial Recovery Act. The law provided for the regula­
tion of production and prices by groups of business men. The 
theory underlying the National Industrial Recovery Act was 
that such control would provide a balance in the economy. 
Business men in the various industries formed groups for the 
purpose of production and price control. The group would 
then create a "code of fair competition." About 550 of these 
codes were created during the era of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act. These codes provided for industrial self- 
government by business men. Production and prices were not 
to be controlled by the law of supply and demand but through 
regulations adopted by members of the respective industrial 
groups. Since such an arrangement was in violation of the 
anti-trust laws, the National Industrial Recovery Act pro­
vided that these statutes were not applicable to participants 
in these industrial groups. Congress required that every code 
contain two provisions regarding labor. The first was that 
every code was required to establish a minimum wage for the 
workers it covered. This was in keeping with the New Deal 
desire to increase the purchasing power. The second was that 
Section 7 (a) be included in each and every code.
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Section 7 (a) provided legal protection for the right 
of workers to organize and bargain collectively. No doubt 
one reason for Section 7 (a) was the desire of Congress to 
correct the obvious injustices of the law of labor relations.
On the other hand, the economic motive of Section 7 (a) cannot 
be disregarded. Legal protection of collective bargaining 
meant stronger unions from the point of view of membership 
and power. This would mean greater effectiveness in pressure 
for higher wages. Thus, a strong organized labor movement 
would serve the basic theory of the New Deal to promote recov- 
ery through increasing the purchasing power of the nation.
Section 7 (a) drew in large part its basic principles 
and language from the Railway Labor Act of 1926, except that 
while the Railway Labor Act confined itself to one basic 
industry which had been considered for some time within the 
legitimate jurisdiction of the Federal government because of 
its interstate character, Section 7 (a) was much more inclu­
sive in its scope. The Railway Labor Act was also much more 
precise in its enforcement provisions and proved to be a much 
more effective piece of legislation when viewed from the pri­
vileged position of hindsight.
9
Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19^9T7"p* 266.
^ United States Statutes at Large, Sixty-Ninth Congress, 
Session I, May 20, 1926.
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Three significant provisions were found in Section
7 (a):
Cl) Employees should have the right to organize and 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, free from interference, restraint, or coercion on 
the part of their employers;
(2) No one seeking employment should be required to 
join a company union or to refrain from joining any labor 
organization of his own choosing; and
(3) Employers should comply with maximum hours,
minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment
approved by the President of the United States. ^  On June 16,
1933, President Roosevelt signed the bill saying:
The law I have just signed was passed to put 
people back to work,... Workers... are here 
given a new character of rights long sought and 
hitherto denied. But they know that the first 
move expected by the nation is a great coopera­
tion of all employers, by one single mass-action, 
to improve the case of workers on a scale never 
attempted in any nation.
Labor boards were created to adjust industrial disputes
arising from the provisions of the act. Some were established
by the codes of fair competition, such as the National Bitumi-
13nous Coal Labor Board and the Newspaper Industrial Board.
•^Ibid.; Seventy-Third Congress, Session!, June 16,1933.
^ T h e  Public Papers and.Addresses of Franklin D. Roose­
velt (New York: Random House, 1938), Volume II, p. 251.
13Ludwig Teller, Labor Disputes andCollective Bargain­
ing (New York: Baker and Voorhis and Company, 1940) Volume II, 
Section 241, p. 680.
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Other boards, brought about by executive order of the Presi­
dent, included the Automobile Labor Board and the National
14Steel Labor Relations Board. Most important, however, was 
the National Labor Board created on August 10, 1933, by exec­
utive order number 6246. President Roosevelt appointed the 
following men to sit on the Board: Senator Robert Wagner was
appointed Chairman and William Green, Dr. Leo Wolrnan, John 
L. Lewis, Walter C. Teagle, Gerard Swope, and Louis Kirstein 
were the regular members.
This Board was established to promptly settle any 
labor disputes arising out of Section 7 (a). President 
Roosevelt explained the need for such an agency as follows:
Soon after the enactment of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, it became apparent that 
some agency would have to be set up to handle 
the labor disputes which were continually arising 
under the various codes.... In order to meet 
that need, I appointed the first National Labor 
Board.... The function of the Board was to con­
sider, adjust, and settle differences and contro­
versies that might arise through differing inter­
pretations of the labor provisions of the codes.... 
The Board soon found it necessary to expand its 
activities, in order to take care of the large 
number of disputes which were arising under 
Section 7 (a)....^5
The Board established twenty regional boards. Each 
consisted of representatives of labor and industry, with 
representatives of the public as impartial chairmen to adjust
14Ibid.
Roosevelt, op, cit., S'. 109, pp. 318-19.
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eases and hold hearings in the regions where the controver­
sies arose- Consequently, cases could be expedited and the 
parties involved could avoid the necessities of going to 
Washington - ^
The National Labor Board was strengthened by an execu­
tive order on December 16, 1933. In explaining what this order 
intended to do, President Roosevelt said:
The foregoing Order was issued by me, to streng­
then the hand of the National Labor Board, which 
I had appointed on August 5, 1933. There had been 
several flagrant cases of defiance of the Board 
by large employers of labor. The foregoing Order 
gave the Board the right to adjust all industrial 
disputes... and to compose all conflicts threaten­
ing the industrial peace of the country. ^
Subsequent executive orders issued on February 1, 1934, and 
February 23, 1934, (Executive Orders Number 6580 and 6612) 
approved all previous orders of the Board and gave it author­
ity to hold elections to determine employees* choice of repre­
sentatives for the purpose of collective bargaining, and to
18publish the names of the elected representatives. The Board
was further authorized to present its findings of violations
of' Section 7 (a) to the Attorney General’s office for action.
The only action possible under the law, however, was the re-
19rnoval of the ’’Blue Eagle” from the offending employer. This
16Ibid.
18Ibid., p. 781.
17Ibid., pp. 524-25. 
19Ibid.
4 3
penalty carried some weight since the Federal government did 
not do any business with industries not displaying the ’’Blue 
Eagle” and asked the public to follow its example. This prac­
tice had been followed since President Roosevelt had issued
20Executive Order Number 6246 on August 10, 1933.
Section 7 (a> contained many basic defects. There was 
no provision for enforcement; it failed to specify which anti­
union activities were illegal, and company dominated unions 
were not expressly declared illegal nor were employers re­
quired to bargain collectively with freely chosen representa­
tives of their employees. It further failed to forbid discri­
mination against employees for union activities. The National 
Labor Board had evolved into an agency which tended to concil­
iate and arbitrate disputes because it had no clear-cut power 
to enforce the spirit of Section 7 (a). This was a tragic 
turn of events since the National Labor Board was quite sucess- 
ful in its early attempts to protect the right of the workers 
to bargain collectively. A good example of this occurred al­
most immediately after the Board’s creation. It intervened in 
a bitter hosiery strike in Berks County, Pennsylvania. More 
than ten thousand workers were involved in this strike and 
every hosiery mill in the country was shut down.
^ Ibid. / Section 109 , pp . 318-19 .
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The National Labor Board settled the strike on the 
basis of a procedure that became known as the "Reading Form­
ula." This formula provided that: (1) The strike was to be
called off; (2) the striking workers were to be reinstated 
without prejudice or discrimination; (3) an election was to 
be held under the supervision of the National Labor Board to 
designate representation for collective bargaining; and (4> 
representatives chosen in such elections were to be author­
ized to negotiate with employers with a view to executing 
agreements concerning wages, hours, and working conditions.
In all but eight out of forty-five mills the workers chose 
the hosiery workers* union as their collective bargaining 
representatives. After the elections were held, a large num­
ber of mill operators first refused to negotiate contracts 
with the union representatives. The National Labor Board
ordered these employers to negotiate and eventually almost
21every firm complied.
The success of the Board in the hosiery industry was 
repeated in other industries. On the basis of the "Reading 
Formula," the Board peacefully settled disputes involving 
hundreds of thousands of workers in the wool, silk, clothing,
21
National Recovery Administration, Release Number 285, 
August 11, 1933.
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22 .street railways, arid machine shop industries. The high 
point in the Board's career was in November, 1933. On Novem­
ber 22 and 23, the Board conducted the most extensive elections 
of its career involving 14,000 coal miners. A special study 
of the National Labor Board stated that for a time **... it 
seemed that, thanks to the Board*s application of 7 (a), an
ideal of industrial democracy was in the process of realiza-
23
tion in the field of industrial relations. By the end of 
the year, however, it was apparent that the National Labor 
Board could not offer adequate protection to the right of 
workers to self-organization and collective bargaining.
A series of events operated to weaken the prestige 
and operating ability of the Board. The first blow was de­
livered by the Weirton Steel Company and the Budd Manufactur­
ing Company. Neither company would abide by the principle of 
the **Reading Formula.** Stubbornly refusing to allow their 
workers collective bargaining rights, the corporations refused 
to permit elections to be held to determine the question of 
union representation. Despite Board protests, the Weirton 
Company held an election in which workers merely voted to 
designate representatives to the company union.
22Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations 
Boards (New York: Brookings Institution, 1935), p. 166.
23Ibid., p. 102.
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By February, 1934, mainly as a result of the failure 
to settle the Weirton and Budd disputes with the "Reading 
Formula," the national Labor Board was on the verge of col­
lapse. Many employers had followed the example of Weirton 
and Budd. Orders of the Board were ignored and its authority 
was disregarded. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Board, 
the frequency of organizational strikes sharply increased. 
Workers were determined to organize their,own labor unions.
As the National Labor Board could not protect them against
anti-union employers, employees resorted to the strike to gain
24their objectives. At this point President Roosevelt tried
to extend the Board's effectiveness by his executive order
granting the Board the additional powers to hold elections and
to recommend to the Attorney General’s office that the "Blue
25Eagle" be taken away from the non-operating companies.
Once again it appeared the Board might function effi­
ciently, but this view appeared short-lived. The intent of 
the President seemed clear. He had given the Board an addi­
tional measure of power and status. The Board had developed 
the "Reading Formula” on its own. Almost immediately after 
the February executive orders, employers challenged the 
"majority principle" laid down by the President in his
24
Ibid., pp. 104-105.
25See page 44, note 21.
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directive regarding free elections.. Employers claimed that 
this principle would deny non-union workers of their employ­
ment rights since the Board held that an employer had to bar­
gain with the majority selected labor unions exclusively.
Since the employers had not previously shown such a great con­
cern for the rights of the employee, the conclusion might be 
drawn that this was simply another method of escaping the 
obligation to bargain collectively. Obviously, collective 
bargaining could not be carried on effectively if employers 
were free to bargain with individual employees. If such were 
the case, an anti-union employer would find it easy to under­
mine the union. In spite of this, Hugh Johnson and Donald R. 
Richberg, the two chief executives of the National Recovery 
Administration, shared the employers* view. This also proved 
to be a serious blow to the Board, and promoted confusion in 
the National Labor Board Policy.
Finally, on May 29, 1934, the Judiciary dealt the 
Board a fatal blow. A district court refused to order the 
Weirton Steel Company to permit a representational election 
which would allow their employees to select a union of their 
choice. It is little wonder, that after such a ruling, employ­
ers and employees alike treated the Board with contempt.
Because of the basic weakness of the law, Senator 
Hagner introduced a bill, in an effort to rectify these defects,
which became known as the Wagner-Labor Disputes Bill. Be­
cause it was jointly sponsored by Senator Wagner of New York 
and Congressman Connery of Massachusetts, it was sometimes 
called the Wagner-Connery Bill. The bill was introduced in 
February of 193l|> and hearings on the bill lasted through the 
winter. When it finally reached the floor of the House and 
the Senate, it was debated at length. Several amendments were 
suggested but because of the highly controversial nature of 
the bill and the time element involved, Congress felt that they 
would be unable to reach an agreement on the law before ad­
journment. Congress believed, however, that some kind of
action was necessary, and in the place of the Labor Disputes
27
Bill passed Public Resolution Number l|ij. on June 19, 193^*
The purpose of the Resolution was to provide for the 
interpretation and enforcement of Section 7 (&)• The National 
Labor Relations Board was created and given the statutory 
power to hold representational elections and to investigate 
violations of Section 7 (a). The only difference between the 
powers of this new Board and the old National Labor Board was 
that these two powers were derived from Statutory Law rather 
than Executive Order. Unfortunately, the new Board suffered
20
Congressional Record, Vol. 7Q,- Part 1|, p. 3Wk3«
27
United States Statutes at Large, 73rd Congress, 
Session 2, June 19, 193U-
49
from the same defects that proved fatal to the National Labor 
Board; that is, it did not have the power to enforce its own 
orders. Enforcement depended upon the action of the Compli- 
ance Division of the National Recovery Administration or the 
Department of Justice. In addition, employer anti-union prac­
tices supposedly outlawed by Section 7 (a) were not spelled 
out in the Resolution. This meant that the National Labor 
Relations Board would have to formulate its own principles 
and the question of enforcement methods were as vague as be­
fore.
Vagueness as to the scope of authority of the National 
Labor Relations Board and divisions of responsibility for the 
enforcement of its decisions constituted the two main obstacles 
to the effective operation of the agency. Employers did not 
respect its orders. Although the National Recovery Admini­
stration did order the removal of the nBlue Eagleft from firms 
which ignored Board decisions, this technique of enforcement 
proved to be unsatisfactory. Consumers did not care whether 
or not a company possessed a ,TBlue Eagle.”
The Department of Justice did not provide adequate 
enforcement. The Board referred thirty-three cases to the 
Department; of these only one injunction was sought for 
enforcement purposes. Sixteen cases were sent back to the 
Board for lack of evidence. In three cases, the Department 
overruled the Board and held that no suit was justified.
5 0
In the remaining cases, the Department for one reason or
28another refused to enforce orders of the Board.
On May 27, 1935, the United States Supreme Court de­
clared the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional 
in the famous Schechter case. This decision, considered by 
many to be one of the most significant court decisions during 
the New Deal period, stated that Congress had delegated legis­
lative power to the President in an illegal manner. In the 
majority opinion, the Court said that the National Industrial 
Recovery Act was unconstitutional:
...insofar as it purports to confer upon the 
President the authority to adopt and make effec­
tive codes of fair competition and impose the
same upon members of each industry for which 
such a code is approved, it is void because of 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power.29
Such a decision outlawed Section 7 (a) along with the remainder
of the National Industrial Recovery Act. It made Public Reso­
lution Number 44 meaningless since the resolution was merely 
created to carry out the provisions of Section 7 (a). It was 
apparent that new legislation was needed to fill the void 
created by the decision of the courts.
^ D .  0. Bov/man, Public Control of Labor Relations 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1942), p. 45.
29Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States,
295 U. S. ^95 (1935).
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Even before the Supreme Court had made its decision 
in the Schechter case, however, it was clear that Section 7 (a) 
and Public Resolution Number 44 were not fulfilling their 
purpose. Senator Wagner summed it up in a radio speech on 
April 21, 1935, as follows:
The virtual collapse of Section 7 (a) is a 
matter of common knowledge, the cause for this 
has been that a relatively small number of un­
fair employers have discriminated against and 
discharged employees who have exercised their 
fundamental rights; have set up a masquerade 
type of union which is really the creature of 
the employer rather than the representative of 
the employee, and have taken advantage of the 
lack of adequate enforcement power behind 
Section 7 (a)....30
As pointed out previously, the basic philosophy of 
Section 7 (a) and Public Resolution Number 44 was to promote 
the organization of unions for the purpose of collective 
bargaining and to stamp out the organization strikes that 
were so prevalent in the country at that time. The New Deal 
promoters of this legislation also felt that, as a result, 
workers would be in a position to demand a fair share of pro­
duction, thereby eliminating the cause of the existing and 
future depressions. Failure to accomplish these objectives 
was evident upon examination of some of the Labor Department 
statistics. From 1927 to 1931, there were on an average
30Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 6, p. 6184.
763 strikes per year, involving 275,000 strikers and costing
5,665,000 labor work days. In 1933 more than 812,137 workers
were out on strike, and in 1934 the number rose to 1,277,344,
Forty-six per cent of all strikes in 1934 were caused by
31organizational disputes. Seventy-five per cent of the cases
brought before the National Labor Relations Board involved the
32same type of dispute.
Failure to aid in establishing industrial peace existed 
by reason of many weaknesses in this legislation. The National 
Labor Relations Board established under Public Resolution 
Number 44 had the power to hear disputes arising out of Sec­
tion 7 (a) and then order an election to be held. The 
employer, however, could appeal the case before any such elec­
tion could take place, thereby postponing any swift decisions 
by the Board. In reviewing cases wherein a company objected 
to such an election, any action taken by the court could be 
delayed for almost a year. The National Labor Relations Board 
lacked the power to investigate except in connection with an 
election. It was not given the quasi-judicial power needed to 
interpret the law and to hand down binding decisions. It was 
unwise to tie Section 7 (a) to the industrial codes because 
this did not involve all workers who dealt in interstate
"^ Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 42, p. 162. 
x o »
United States Senate Report Number 573, 74th Congress 
1st Session, pp. l-*2.
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commerce. Both of the laws were ambiguous. They were inter­
preted in different ways by the administrators of the law.
For example, Hugh Johnson, who headed the National Industrial 
Recovery Administration, believed that Section 7 (a) did not 
mean that the majority of the workers could elect a represen­
tative to speak for all of the workers. In other words, he 
recognized the concept of proportional representation. Theo­
retically, it would then be possible for an employer to deal
with several organizations separately, making different agree-
3 3
ments with each of them. On the other hand, as Lloyd
Garrison, Dean of the University of Wisconsin School of Law,
pointed out, the National Labor Relations Board in several
cases accepted the principle of majority rule.^ Another
inherent weakness was the inability of the National Labor
Relations Board to enforce its decisions. As Senator Wagner
stated during a Senate debate:
The present National Labor Relations Board 
has not been vested with enforcement powers...
It is the administration rather than the Board 
which exercises final discretion in determining 
whether the ”Blue Eagle” shall be removed or _ 
whether government contracts shall be cancelled. 5
3'’ibid. , p. 5.
3 ^Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee 
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 2 , p. 127.
■ 35'Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 7, p. 7568.
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The National Labor Relations Board could investigate and make 
recommendations to the National Industrial Recovery Admini­
stration, but any final action rested with the latter.
Many of the disputes did not pass directly to the 
National Labor Relations Board for hearing. Instead, they 
were delegated to one of the many conciliatory boards which 
had been established by law or executive order through the 
years. There were, at one time, as many as fifteen of these 
conciliatory boards established to handle problems within a 
particular industry. Senator Wagner argued that this merely 
resulted in confusion as to jurisdiction and ultimately ended 
in conflicting decisions. He described these industrial 
boards as follows:
Partisan in composition, living in an atmos­
phere of compromise and conciliation, they are 
well designed to adjust wages and hear contro­
versies... but they are not suitable for enforc­
ing the provisions of 7 (a).5?
The greatest weakness of this existing legislation,
however, was its inability to prevent an employer from creating 
a union or organization which he could dominate; jl. ^e., the
company union. Section 7 (a> stated:
No employee and no one seeking employment shall 
be required,as a condition of employment, to join
3 6Ibid., p. 7569. 
3 7Ibid.
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any company union or to refrain from joining, 
organizing, or assisting a labor union of his
choosing.28
However, neither Section 7(a) nor Public Resolution Number
44 gave the National Labor Relations Board or any other agency
the power to prevent employers from ignoring this directive.
Neither did it provide for any penalties for failure to comply
with this law. In these cases, the Board was powerless to
initiate any effective action against an employer. At best,
it could merely recommend that the "Blue Eagle” be taken away.
Because of the inability to prevent employer domination of
unions, the fundamental purpose of this legislation was
defeated. William Green, President of the American Federation
of Labor, in testifying before the Senate Education and Labor
Committee, pointed out that:
Of the company unions on which we have reports, 
only eighteen per cent were formed prior to the 
National Industrial Recovery Act; sixteen per cent 
of the total were not started until an attempt was 
made by the employees to form a bonafide labor 
union. The plan originated directly with an 
officer of the company in fourteen per cent of 
the cases, and in fifty-one per cent, the organ­
izers were paid by the company.29
In all cases involving company unions heard before the old
National Labor Board, the constitution or by-laws were written
^United States Statutes at Large, Session 1, June 16. i955m ■ -...... — —  — — ----------- * V
^ Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 1, p. 110.
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by the employer or his lawyers. The company financed and 
organized them.^ Prime examples were the Firestone Tire and 
Rubber Company, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and Goodrich 
Tire and Rubber Company.^ When complaints were lodged against 
these companies for ignoring Section 7 (a), the National Labor 
Relations Board ordered that elections be held. In all 
instances the companies appealed these decisions to the courts.^ 
This method then served the purpose of postponing an election 
and gave the employer the opportunity to further the cause of 
the company union. |
In many instances, companies hired full-time organiza­
tional staffs to come into their plants and convince their 
employees that a company union was to their advantage. Fire­
stone hired ninety-two men for this purpose, B. F. Goodrich I
hired one hundred fifty men for the same reason, and Goodyear
/ *2
hired sixty men. Not once was there any suggestion by a wit­
ness testifying before the Congressional committee investiga­
ting this problem that the provisions outlawing the company 
union was in any way effective.
On the other hand, this early legislation, though basi­
cally ineffective, had some positive results. Immediately 
following the passage of Section 7 (a), the membership in unions
4°ibid., p. in. 
4^Ibid.
4 -^Ibid.
45Ibid.. p. 1 1 2 .
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was encouraged, William Green announced in 1933 that the 
American Federation of Labor had increased its membership by 
1,300,000 as a result of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act.^* Xt also ended legislative antipathy to the "yellow 
dog” contract, being more effective than the Norris-La Guardia 
Act in prohibiting execution of such a contract.^5
The experience of this early legislation emphasized 
the care needed in drafting labor legislation. Litigation 
resulting from carelessly phrased sections of Section 7 (a) 
was extensive in both Federal and State courts. No sooner 
had the National Industrial Recovery Act and state acts pat­
terned after the same entered the statute books than the 
courts advanced the theory that strikes, picketing, and boy­
cotts were thereby outlawed. In one case a New Jersey court 
held that in view of the acts, "strikes are forbidden by the 
public policy of nation and s t a t e s . . S i n c e  the acts pro­
vided for the mediation of disputes, this made resorting to 
such mediation a necessary prerequisite to engage in any form 
of labor activity for the enforcement of any demand.
^ N e w  York Times , October 2, 1933 , p . 1.
^Teller, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 662.
^Elkind v. Retail ClerksT International Protective 
Association, 114 N. J. eq. 586, 169 A  494, 1933.
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47A New Jersey court held this to be true. It was also sug­
gested by some that the National Industrial Recovery Act out-
48lawed National labor unions, but on appeal this view of the
49lower court was reversed.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this early 
New Deal experimentation in labor legislation is that it failed 
in making any basic change in the collective bargaining process 
before the Schechter decision had been announced. When the 
Supreme Court did render a decision on the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, it emphasized this failure and pointed up the 
need for new legislation to replace what had been nullified. 
Senator Wagner’s leadership in this field continued and his 
role in subsequent legislation was significant.
47 -Lichtman v. Leather Workers Industrial Union, 114 
N. J. Eq. 596, 169 a 498, 1933.
^Bayonne Textile Corporation v . American Federation 
of Silk Workers, 114 N. J., Eq. 307, 168 A 799, 1933.
49116 N. J. Eq. 146, 172 A 551, 92 ALR 1450, 1934.
CHAPTER III
THE WAGNER ACT
Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
had failed before the Supreme Court declared the act unconsti­
tutional. This was clearly indicated when Senator Wagner 
introduced the Labor Disputes Bill the previous year. When 
this bill failed to pass and Public Resolution Number 44 was 
passed as a substitute, Senator Wagner and his followers were 
dissatisfied and, consequently, early in the 1935 Congressional 
session, a new bill was introduced which was basically the same 
as the rejected Labor Disputes Bill. Senator Wagner was not 
only instrumental in drafting this new bill, but played a deci­
sive role in steering it through it through Congress..
The fact that in the decades following the passage of 
the Wagner Act a close political alliance has grown up between 
the Democratic Party and labor, plus the lasting importance of 
the act which was passed at the height of the New Deal period, 
has left the general impression in the public mind that the act 
was a key piece of New Deal legislation and that Roosevelt was 
instrumental in securing its enactment. In fact, there is 
adequate evidence that Roosevelt himself was never greatly 
interested in the subject and gave his support only at the 
last minute. Frances Perkins, who was President Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of Labor throughout his term of office, has said of
60
the President’s relationship to the Wagner Act:
It ought to be on record that the President 
did not take part in developing the National 
Labor Relations Act and, in fact, was hardly 
consulted about it. It was not a part of the 
President’s program. It did not particularly 
appeal to him when it was described to him.
All of the credit for it belongs to Wagner.^
Raymond Moley, at that time still a member in good
standing of Roosevelt’s Brain Trust, substantiates Secretary
Perkins* appraisal. He went further and explained Roosevelt’s
last-minute adoption of the act on the grounds that the
President ’’needed the influence and votes of Wagner on so many
pieces of legislation and partly because of the invalidation
of the National Industrial Recovery Act.”
Secretary Perkins, herself, did not play a significant
role in the drafting of the act. When she appeared before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, she addressed herself
to only one problem; that was whether the Board should be a
part of the Labor Department or become an independent agency.
She was quite mild in her expressions but stated that she felt
■ 3
the Board should be a part of her department. All in all,
1
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Know (New York: Viking 
Press, 1946), p. 239.
2Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1939), p. 304.
^Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 1, p. 65.
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it was strikingly evident upon examination of the hearings that 
administration spokesmen played a very minor role in the whole 
proceeding. It should be said for Roosevelt, however, that 
when he finally gave his support to the legislation, he was 
not swayed by industry pressure to change his position.
After May 27, 1935, the date the Schechter decision 
was handed down, the legislative pace quickened. Senator 
Wagner was extremely anxious for speedy passage of his bill. 
House and Senate hearings on the measure were intensified, for 
the members of these committees were well aware that with the 
destruction of Section 7 (&), the collective bargaining ques­
tion had been set back three full years. It was apparent that 
industrial peace could not be established in the absence of a 
law which would effectively establish the collective bargain­
ing process.
Stimulating Congress was the powerful voice of organ­
ized labor channeled through the American Federation of Labor. 
The campaign which it conducted was vigorous and unceasing. 
Organized labor had tasted and enjoyed the fruits of a national 
protective legislative program. Section 7 (&), despite its 
shortcomings, served to whet the appetite of organized labor 
for a truly effective labor law. Labor leaders were aware of 
the tremendous benefits that the union movement would acquire 
from an adequate law protecting the right of the worker to 
self-organize and bargain collectively. Mass meetings were
6 2
held to urge the passage of the bill.- Organized labor made 
crystal clear the character of its future program. It threat­
ened to work for the defeat of each and every senator or rep­
resentative who opposed the law. Senator Wagner was even more 
vigorous in his activities on behalf of his bill than ever
Convinced that the previous legislation had been a
failure, and that this indicated a crucial need for his bill, 
he stated in April of 1935•
Thus the American battle for industrial liberty 
has been waged upon the issue whether workers 
shall be free to associate together if that Is 
their desire. The first great victory was won 
when, after seven years of frustration, Congress 
passed the Norris-La Guardi a Act. But the ela­
tion of the friends of freedom was short-lived. 
Devious devices were used to defeat the objec­
tive of the Act. Even without the ’yellow dog’ 
contract the unfair employer could discharge and 
discriminate against workers if they violated 
any'dictate of his will. As a remedy, the famous 
Section 7 (a) was passed, forbidding any interfer­
ence with the right of workers to organize for 
purposes of mutual advancement.... The virtual 
collapse of Section 7 (a) is a matter of common 
knowledge. The curse of this has been that a 
relatively small number of unfair employers have 
discriminated against and discharged employees 
who exercised their fundamental rights; have set 
up a masquerade type of union which is really 
the creature of the employer rather than the rep­
resentative of the employee, and have taken advan-
enforcement power
before
^Congressional Record, Vol. 79j Part 6, p. 618I4.
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Support of the bill by the general public appeared 
obvious, if one could gauge by the subsequent congressional 
vote in favor of it. The press, however, was definitely not 
universal in its acceptance of the bill. Although such maga­
zines as the New Republic, Literary Digest, and Nation came 
out in favor of the bill, many other magazines and newspapers 
opposed it. An example of favorable commentary on the bill 
was an editorial in The Nation which said in part:
The most important provision of the Bill goes 
to the heart of the present difficulty in that 
it proposes an independent labor board with 
exclusive and definite authority..„ to inter­
pret and enforce^the laws dealing with collec­
tive bargaining.*'
An editorial in the New York Times noted that this bill was 
unfair and biased in favor of labor.^
Various religious groups announced their approve.! of 
the bill. The Right Reverend Monseigneur John A. Ryan, Direc­
tor of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, sent a statement to Congress endorsing 
the bill, as did Rabbi Sidney E. Goldstein, Chairman of the 
Social Science Justice Commission, Central Conference of 
American Rabbis. Rabbi Goldstein said:
The history of labor in America and in other 
countries proved that the workers can advance
t.
Editorial in The Nation, March 6 , 1935*
6 . 
Editorial in the New York Times, May 23, 1935*
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their own welfare only to the degree that they 
acquire power to bargain collectively through 
organization of forces• In this economic crisis 
it is more necessary than ever to protect and 
preserve the rights of labor to organize and to 
direct its own destiny.7
The statement of policy which was contained in Section 
1 of the National Labor Relations Act revealed a dual objec­
tive. The first was to promote industrial peace by encourag­
ing and directing collective bargaining. The second was to 
equalize bargaining power between employers and employees by 
removing restraints upon the right of employees to organize.
To accomplish this dual objective, the act provided for two 
distinct types of proceedings. The first defined certain 
activities engaged in by employers as "unfair labor practices" 
and prohibited the employers from engaging in them. The 
second contained provisions for setting up the machinery where­
by representatives of employees could be designated for the 
purpose of bargaining collectively.
The act provided for a three-member board which had the 
power to authorize rules and regulations necessary for carrying 
out provisions of the act. The Board would be appointed for a 
five year term by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. Each member would receive a salary of $10,000 a 
year. The Board was not empowered to engage in conciliation,
^Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 7, p. 7680.
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mediation, or arbitration. The Board was given the additional
power of moving to the scene of its inquiry, and subpoenaing
8records needed for its investigation.
Section 7, which was probably the heart of the act, 
provided that employees should have the right to self-organi­
zation. The right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining was also asserted.
The act set forth five unfair labor practices which, 
if committed by an employer, subjected him to certain sanctions 
contained in the act. These five unfair labor practices were:
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the act;
(2) to dominate or to interfere with the formation or admini­
stration of any labor organization or to give financial aid 
or other support to it, except that the employer might allow 
his employee to meet with him during working hours without 
loss of time or pay, subject to the Board’s rules and regula­
tions; (3> to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization, by discrimination in regard to the hiring or 
firing of his employees, or any other condition of employment;
8
United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
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(It was provided that the employer could enter into a closed 
shop agreement with a labor organization if the labor organi­
zation was the proper representative of the employees, and the 
organization was not a company dominated union) ; (4) to dis­
charge or otherwise disriminate against an employee because he 
had filed charges or given testimony under the act; (5) to 
refuse to bargain collectively with the proper representatives 
of his employees.^ It should be borne in mind that the unfair 
labor practices were limited to those found in Section S. The 
act was specific in its terms. Neither the Board nor the courts 
could prohibit any practices which they thought were unfair; 
only those listed in Section 8 could be considered illegal prac­
tices. The Senate Committee on Education and Labor said in its 
report: nThese unfair labor practices are supported by wealth
of precedent in prior Federal l a w . T h e  following may be 
listed as examples: The Railway Labor Act of 1926, The Norris-
La Guardia Act, and the 1933 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.
It is apparent upon close examination of the unfair 
labor practices that determination of the proper bargaining 
representative of employees was important under the act for
9 Ibid,
Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and La^or, United St a tes S e n a t e 7 4 t h  Congress,
1st Session, Part 2, p. 8.
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two reasons. The first was to determine the validity of 
closed shop agreements entered into under Section 8 ( 3 }  of the 
act. The law did not make closed shop agreements illegal; 
however, it did not encourage them either. While it allowed 
unions to negotiate such an agreement if it was legally permis­
sible to do so in the state, the act did prevent the negotia­
tion of the closed shop if the negotiating agency did not live 
up to the provisions of the l a w . T h i s  was to prevent the 
company dominated union from securing a closed shop agreement. 
The second reason was that it fastened on the employer the 
obligation to bargain collectively as directed in Section 8 (5) 
of the act. This section made it an unfair labor practice for 
an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with his employees 
or their representatives. An agreement did not have to be
12reached, however, but a bonafide effort had to be attempted.
'What this actually meant was the Board would have to determine
whether the employer was making a genuine effort or not. An
employer by simply sitting down at a table and saying "nothing
doing" was not fulfilling his obligations; he had to show good
faith by offering a proposal, and willingly accepting counter
proposals for study. Evidence of an inflexible attitude indi­
cated bad faith. ^
U IMd., p. 12. 1 2Xbid.
. * '
I3Ibid.
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Xf there was any doubt as to which union, of several 
claiming unions, was the majority union suited to represent 
the workers, the National Labor Relations Board had the power 
to hold an election. The winner was then certified as the 
union which properly represented all of the workers in that 
particular unit for purposes of collective bargaining. In 
this way the act endorsed the principle of majority rule.
The question of whether or not majority rule was to be pro­
moted in the act was hotly contested in hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Education and Labor. Every witness 
appearing in favor of the act made it quite clear that the 
principle of majority rule was necessary if the act was to 
work. It was pointed out that one of the main weaknesses of 
Section 7 (a) was the interpretation made by Hugh Johnson 
allowing proportional representation. Charlton Ogburn, 
appearing for the American Federation of Labor, insisted that 
in order to give unions an equal bargaining position it was 
imperative to accept the concept of majority rule. In point­
ing out what he considered to be the evils of proportional 
representation, Mr. Ogburn said: "Rival groups of workers
stimulated into jealousies and bitterness can never present a 
united front. That is why employers are so solicitous of the 
right of the minority to be represented."^
^Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress
1st Session, p. 151.
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Appearing in opposition to the act, Walter Harnisch-
feger of the National Association of Manufacturers, said that
he opposed the concept of majority representation "because it
deprives the minority... of their freedom of action in matters
15of bargaining." In defense* of the act, the Senate Committee 
explained: "... the majority cannot make an agreement more
beneficial to them than to the minority or non-members of the 
union." The committee also pointed out that when the major­
ity made a contract it applied to everyone in the unit; that
only an organization which was constructed for the purpose of
17
collective bargaining could bargain for all. The act did
preserve the right of the individual employees or groups of
employees to present grievances to their employer and, as the
committee pointed out, the National War Labor Board under the
Railway Labor Act had established a precedent for the principle
18of majority rule.
If there was a question as to which union of several 
claiming unions represented the appropriate bargaining unit, 
the Board was given the power to select the appropriate unit 
and an election would be held to determine if the majority of
15Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee 
on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany Bill, United States 
Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 239.
Ibid., p. 13 17Ibid., pp. 15-14.
1 8Ibid., p. 126.
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the workers within the selected unit favored the union* If^ 
they did, the employer was expected to bargain with the rep­
resentative of that unit. Thereby Congress gave to the 
National Labor Relations Board broad discretionary authority 
in determining whether a union should represent an employer 
unit, a craft unit, a plant unit, or a subdivision thereof. 
This was patterned after Section 2 of the 1934 Amendment to 
the Railway Labor Act and was vigorously objected to by the 
employer groups on the grounds that it would give the Board
the power to favor one union as opposed to another. It was
feared that the Board would favor the unions affiliated with 
the American Federation of Labor over unions organized on 
the company level. Congressman Rich of Pennsylvania, an 
opponent of the bill, reasoned:
The Wagner Act will work in the interest of 
only a small minority of workers represented by 
professional labor leaders, will promote indus­
trial strife, will bring about epidemic of labor 
disputes... will in practice tend to make a 
closed shop of every plant and to make every
employee carry a union card if he is to earn a
living .3-9
"At the time all labor leaders appeared to favor this 
section of the act. It was possible that at some future date 
one American Federation of Labor union might find itself 
pitted against another in a National Labor Relations Board
^ Congressional Record, Vol. 79, Part 9, pp. 9690-1.
7 1
election, but if this occurred it was reasonable to suppose 
that the government would take the position that the question 
of which union should compete for votes was a matter for 
internal union deci-sion. This was in fact the position that 
the Board later took. In the summer of 193& the Board was 
asked to conduct an election in which two American Federation 
of Labor unions were rivals. The Board declined, pointing out 
that this was in essence a jurisdictional dispute which, ought 
to be settled by the American Federation of Labor itself. A 
different question came up in 19375 however, when the National 
Labor Relations Board was requested to intervene in a dispute 
involving the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the 
American Federation of Labor. This time the Board did inter­
vene on the ground that there was no apparent body to which
20
the question could be referred. Thereafter the Board found 
itself plagued with cases in which the American Federation of 
Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations were con- 
t ending parti es.
Congress gave the Board adequate power to stop unfair 
labor practices. Section 10 of the act authorized the Board, 
after determining that one had committed an unfair labor prac­
tice, to issue cease and desist orders. They could then take
Archibald Cox and John T. Dunlop, tfRegulations of 
Collective Bargaining b y  the National Labor Relations Board," 
Harvard Law Review, vol. 6 3 , (1950), p. 3 8 9 .
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other affirmative action including reinstatement of employees 
with or without back pay. The issuance of such an order had 
to be preceeded by the service of a complaint with a notice 
of hearing and the person complained of was given the right 
to answer to the charge. A hearing was then held before the 
Board or agent of the Board and, in the event compliance with 
the BoardTs orders was not secured, then the Board was author­
ized to apply to a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for enforce­
ment of the order. The aggrieved party could appeal the deci­
sion of the Board to the Circuit Court of Appeals. It is 
important to note that an appeal to the Court by the aggrieved 
party did not stop the order of the Board from being enforced. 
This was insisted upon because under Section 7 (a) the courts 
were used by employers as a means of delaying action.
The Board was given the power of subpoena in Section 11 
of the act with authority to apply to any Federal District 
Court for enforcement. In the event of failure to obey a sub­
poena , contempt proceedings could be brought to bear on the 
offending party. Willful interference with a Board member or 
its representative or agents was criminally punishable.
The act contained two so-called limitations. The 
first preserved the right to strike. The second provided for 
a separability clause. This meant that if one section of the 
act were to be held unconstitutional, the other sections would
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not be affected. This has proved to be of no importance in 
view of the fact that the act has been held constitutional in 
its entirety.^
Three basic principles can be found in the act. The 
first was employee self-organization unrestrained by employer 
interference coupled with acceptance in good faith by the 
employer of the practice of collective bargaining. As a 
result of this first principle, it may be said that the pur­
pose of the act was to encourage labor organization. The 
second principle was that of majority representation, while 
the third was a remedial principle involving prompt admini­
strative machinery for enforcement of the provisions of the 
act in preference to criminal penalties. The procedure adop­
ted in this act was patterned after the Federal Trade Commis­
sion Act*
The National Labor Relations Act was viewed in many 
quarters as a kind of emergency legislation which was highly 
distasteful, and as a result bitter opposition sprang up 
against it. The reasons for hostilities to the act must be 
understood in the light of the legal and constitutional back­
ground against which it was passed. There is no doubt that 
it was a serious break with the past. While it claimed merely
21A complete discussion of the constitutionality of 
the act can be found in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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to confer upon labor the right to self-organization and the Y 
choice of representatives for the purpose of collective bar- \ 
gaining, and appeared upon first glance to be an innocuous 
restatement of Federal Judicial and Statutory Law, the provi­
sions of the act went much further. One important feature of 
the act was its recognition for the first time in Federal 
labor legislative history of a social interest in labor organi­
zation. This was the underlying theory of the unfair labor 
practices declared by the act. Employers were forbidden to 
dominate, restrain, or interfere with labor organizations /
engaged in self-organization because such self-organization / 
and the resulting collective bargaining was to such a social 
good as to make unlawful any interference with its development.
Many of the unfair practices listed in the act had been 
for years considered legal and legitimate rights of the 
employer. Even though a similar act had been passed previously 
in the form of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, this was restric­
ted to a public utility which has long been considered a proper 
reason for limitations upon labor's rights and employers * pri­
vileges .
It was also a new concept to impose upon the employer 
the duty to bargain in good faith with the employees' repre­
sentatives. The law prior to the enactment of the National 
Labor Relations Act was stated in Hunt v. Simonds in the fol­
lowing way: ’’It is obviously the right of every citizen to
75
deal or refuse to deal with any other citizen and no person
has ever thought himself entitled to complain in a Court of
22Justice of a refusal to deal with him.11
There were many additional reasons for the hostilities 
towards the act. It was another example of the extension of 
the power of the Executive Department. It was one more admini­
strative board added to what appeared to be an ever-increasing 
number of boards and bureaus. It regulated business enterprise. 
Both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade 
Commission met with similar opposition because of their regula­
tory nature. One leading authority on labor law stated their 
case when he said:
Government agencies are hardly popular when they 
control and command; hence government agencies 
which control and command are even more rarely 
popular, and a new government agency which controls 
and commands in situations so surcharged with emo­
tion as have been those committed to the National 
Labor Relations Board would be a latter-day miracle 
if it were popular with all whom its operations 
affect. The National Labor Relations Board was 
not such a miracle.23
Another reason for the unpopularity of the act was its 
alleged one-sidedness. It provided for unfair labor practices 
committed by employers without also providing for employee 
unfair labor practices. Walter Harnischfeger, testifying for
^Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583 (1854).
23 -6 Ludwig Teller, Labor Pisputes and Collective Bargain­
ing (New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company, IncT," 194o), V . II, 
p. 695.
the National Association of Manufacturers, said that the
unfair labor practices were 11... arbitrary, ill-advised, and
utterly lacking in mutuality... and should, if unfair, be
24prohibited for labor as well as for business.”
Pointing out that the compulsions of the bill could 
run against management, attorney Walter Gordon Merritt, appear­
ing for the League of Industrial Rights, argued strenuously 
that if management was going to be required to bargain with 
the elected representative of its employees, the least the 
government could do was to require certain minimum standards 
of the union. Merritt cited various cases from his New York 
experience to prove that unions ” ... like all other human 
institutions,” engage in wrong doings and that it would be 
wrong to force companies to bargain with such unions. By way 
of ”extreme illustration,” he pointed out the possibility that 
a company might have to bargain with a Communistic organiza­
tion, and although he observed this was an ”absurd” example, 
he used it to make the point that the bill should have some 
provisions to protect the employer from this kind of situation.
A  first step in understanding the reasoning of the 
’’one-sidedness” argument comes with the recognition that
rlearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee 
on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 74th Congress ,
1st Session, p. 238.
2 3Ibid., pp. 309-34.
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one-sided legislation was not new in American history. A 
classic example of this type of legislation was the tariff.
The bitter battles which an Agricultural South and an Indus­
trial North fought over this issue in our early history are 
legendary. Moreover, the argument that infant industry encour­
aged and protected by the tariff, should be asked to abide by 
certain standards of working conditions or wages were not even 
considered. There were other examples of legislation which 
were beneficial to one group at the expense of another. The 
explanation as to why this occurs is that in every case 
legislators have had objectives which they were trying to 
achieve. Balanced legislation may appear to be more fair, but 
it may at the same time be less effective in achieving the 
desired objective.
Basic to an understanding of the one-sidednesS of the 
Hagner Act lies in the conclusion by its backers that a more 
balanced approach would fail to achieve their objective. This 
showed up quite clearly in the debates on the Tydings Amend­
ment when the bill was finally up for passage. Section 7 of 
the bill read:
Employees shall have the right to self­
organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations to bargain collectively through 
the representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in concerted activities, for the pur­
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.26
^^United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress, 
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
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Senator Tydings proposed that the phrase nfree from 
coercion or intimidation from any source” be added to this
07
sectionv In support of his amendment he argued that if employ­
ees were given the right to organize they ought to be free from 
interference not only by the employer but from any source.
This amendment was, of course, aimed at the organizational 
activities engaged in by the American Federation of Labor.
This argument had a strong appeal to many senators who did 
not fully understand the implication of such an amendment.
The sponsors of the bill resisted the amendment successfully 
with the argument that it was exactly what industry opponents 
of the bill wished. Senator Wagner reasoned that the courts 
could not be 'trusted to interpret the word ^coercion11-when 
applied to labor organizations. He said:
But how has the word ’’coercion" as among 
employees been interpreted by the.courts? The 
use of pickets, mere persuasion without any 
force, threats, or intimidation, has been deemed 
coercion; and employees simply trying to persuade 
their fellow workers to join a particular organi­
zation have been charged with coercion.28
The fear that the Tydings amendment would destroy the
purpose of the bill drove the proponents of the bill on to
overcome the efforts to amend it. Huey Long expressed this 
view during the debate when he said:
97
Congressional Record, 74th Congress, Vol. 79, Part 7,
p. 7650.
28Ibid., p. 7654.
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The Senator Tydings knows that we have been 
trying to get laborers the right to organize for 
quite a while, and we never have been able to 
draft a law yet which has not been whittled down.
By interpretation, the laws have always been cut 
down. Does not the Senator think we can take a 
chance for once in our lives for a little while?
If the Senator from New York can draft an act 
that will protect labor, he will be the only man 
who has ever been able to do it. Nobody else 
has ever been able to do it with the court inter­
pretations. X do not believe we ought to whittle 
away the bill and not take a chance.29
Backers of the bill also argued that the contention 
the bill was unfair because it was one-sided regarding the 
unfair labor practices was invalid because the Common Law and 
Statutory Law of the several states and Federal government 
were then adequate to deal with unlawful activities carried 
on by labor. It was further argued that the establishment 
of employee unfair labor practices would impede the enforce­
ment machinery set up by the act. The Committee report which 
accompanied the National Labor Relations bill upon its refer­
ence to the United States Senate answered the argument in this 
way:
The only result of introducing proposals of this 
sort into the bill, in the opinion of the committee, 
would be to overwhelm the Board in every case with 
counter-charges and recriminations that would pre­
vent it from doing the task that needs to be done. 
There is hardly a labor controversy in which during 
the heat of excitement statements are not made on 
both sides which, in the hands of hostile or unsym­
pathetic courts , might be construed to come under
2 9Ibid., p. 7655
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the common-law definition of fraud, which in some 
states extends even to misstatements innocently 
made, but without reasonable investigation. And 
if the Board should decide to dismiss such charges, 
its order of dismissal would be subject to review 
in the Federal Coiirts. Proposals such as these 
under discussion are not new. They were suggested 
when Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act was up for discussion, and when the 
1934 Amendments to the Railway Labor Act were 
before Congress. In neither instance did they 
command the support of Congress.50
The Committee report was very specific in answering 
the argument put forth by various employer groups that if the 
employer could not influence or coerce the employees in their 
organization activities or the choice of their representatives 
then the same thing should be forbidden to employees or labor 
organizations. The Committee's answer to this was:
The corresponding right of employers is that 
they should be free to organize without the inter­
ference on the part of the employees; no showing 
has been made that this right of employers to 
organize needs federal protection as against 
employees.
It should be understood, however, that employers did not ask 
for protection to organize themselves. They wanted to prevent 
the unions from interfering with their employees. The Commit­
tee continued by saying: ,fTo say that employees and labor
organizations should be no more active than employers in the
Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee
on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany Bill, United States
Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 15.
51Ibid.. p. 17.
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organization of employees is untenable; this would defeat the
'■ . : . ■ 32
very objects of the bill.,r
Somewhere in the testimony of almost every industry 
representative during the course of the hearings on the pro­
posed law was the thesis that a major defect of the bill was 
its premise that the relationship between employer and employee 
was one of conflict rather than cooperation. This view was 
directly related to the fact that the existing company unions 
would largely be abolished and industry was not ready to admit 
that these unions were largely company dominated, or that out­
side unions could come in without disrupting the whole econ­
omy. To the industrialist, a strong national union movement 
was something to be feared. This point of view was aptly 
stated in a resolution passed by the Cleveland, Ohio, Chamber 
of Commerce, which read in part:
The friendly and cooperative relationship exist­
ing between thousands of employers and their employ­
ees - existing to so large an extent that such 
relationships are the rule and not the exception - 
should not be subj’ected to demoralization by pro­
fessional labor agitators whose primary obj'ective 
is to foment antagonism, with a view to an organ­
ized power, socially, politically, and economi­
cally dangerous to the American Commonwealth.^
5 2lbid., p. 17.
33 . .
Hearings on a National Labor Board, Committee on
Education and Labor, United States Senate, 73rd Congress, 
2nd Session, Part 1, p. 633.
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Some employers were much more moderate in their 
opinion. Henry Dennison of the Dennison Manufacturing Company, 
who had served as an industry member of the National Labor 
Board, was such an employer. While conceding that many inde­
pendent unions were in fact company dominated, Mr. Dennison 
said:
But my firm conviction is that under today's 
conditions, this evil will be short-lived, 
whereas the evils' of forcing the growth of out­
side unions beyond the rate at which capable 
leaders can be discovered and can gain experi­
ence will last a generation. In few, if any, 
plans can a hog-tied company union survive more 
than a year or two; they will either evolve 
into true and independent employee representa­
tion or blow up and reform into stiff and often 
antagonistic unions controlled from without.
But a sufficient number of new unions unski11- 
fully lead - and union membership is one of the 
most highly skilled of the arts - will lead to 
enough fool trouble, bitter strife, and blood­
shed to set the whole country blindly against 
unionism. ^ 4
If industry saw dangers in the proposed legislation, 
the Communist oriented trade union Unity League did not. Its 
spokesman, William F. Dunne, said:
We are against this bill just as we were against 
7 (a), and for practically the same reasons - 
because it is intended to be used as another will- 
o-the-wisp to dance before the eyes of the working 
class while the employers and official labor 
leaders in the National Recovery Act machinery, 
thinking of "national recovery" in terms of "all 
the people," which means the capitalist class, 
which means mainly the big employers, trick them 
further into the swamp of starvation wages and 
permanent mass unemployment
3 4Ibid., p. 403 3 3Ibid■, pp. 990-91.
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Summarizing objections to the act based on the nclass 
conflicts argument, Congressman Eaton stated during debate:
This and all similar legislation rests upon the 
absurd proposition that all business men are dis­
honest and unfair, and all employees are incapable 
of self-determination or self-government. It 
places the relation of employer and employee upon 
a permanent and unalterable war basis. It rests 
upon the false assumption that the interests of
employer and employee are by their intrinsic
nature absolutely irreconcilable....- It puts the 
employer in a criminal class, subject to fine and 
imprisonment for a list of new crimes fastened 
upon him under legal processes as unjust and 
unfair as they certainly will turn out to be uncon­
stitutional.
Those who were favorably disposed to the legislation 
answered the "class conflict*1 argument by reasoning that a 
free independent union would put employees and employers on 
an equal footing, thereby promoting mutual respect. They also
said that a national union was an economic necessity in modern
circumstances. Senator Wagner said:
Under modern industrial conditions problems of 
wages and hours are regional or even national in 
scope. More important, only representatives who 
are not subservient to the employer with whom they 
deal can act freely in the interest of the workers. 
Simple common sense tells us that a man does not 
possess this freedom when he bargains with those who 
control his source of livelihood... collective bar­
gaining becomes a mockery when the spokesman of the 
employees is the marionette of the employer. ^
^Congressional Record, Vol 79, Part 9, pp. 9681-2. 
5 7Ibid.. Part 7, pp. 7569-70.
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The generality of some of the sections contained in 
the bill were also a source of hostility* In Section 8 (1) 
there was reference to "interference, restraint, and coer­
cion" without giving any definition of the precise meaning 
of these terms. The Board later gave the words the widest 
interpretation including within the ban of that section what 
it called "subtle forms of coercion."^ This, of course, was 
exactly what the opponents of the bill feared. Again, the 
Board was given no guide lines in connection with the selec­
tion of an appropriate bargaining unit under Section 9 (b) 
of the bill by which to determine that unit. In the eyes of 
the enemies of the bill, this gave the Board too much arbi­
trary power, allowing a Board unfriendly to industry to choose 
an undesirable unit.
Probably the most argumentative section of the bill 
was Section 8 (5>. This section imposed upon the employer the 
duty to bargain in good faith collectively with the representa­
tives of his employees. Because these terms were not properly 
defined and appeared to be ambiguous, it caused uncertainty 
and, consequently, animosity among those who were required to 
conform to the Act.
Another source of antagonism to the bill was Section 
2 (3> which stated that "a striking employee" should not lose
"■^Harrisburg Childress Dress Company, 2 N.. L. R. B. 1058,
(1937).
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his status as an employee because of engaging in a strike.
Although labor unions had been hoping for such a status for
years, the law up to this time gave little support to this
contention. A strike was generally held to terminate the
3 9
employment relationship. Under Section 2 (3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, on the other hand, the term 
^employee" was defined so as to include "any individual whose 
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor 
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and sub­
stantially equivalent .■'employment,.. As a result, the employer 
was obliged by the act to reinstate without discrimination 
striking employees and, where the strike was the result of an 
unfair labor practice, to discharge employees hired to replace 
the strikers and to reinstate the strikers upon termination of 
the strike.^ One who was obligated to bargain in good faith 
with those who impaired his business, or who was under obliga­
tion to reinstate striking employees, could not be expected 
to be friendly to legislation which imposed such obligations.
Some of the major objections to the act were on consti­
tutional grounds. In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court
3 9
Teller, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 238-9.
^National Labor Relations Board v. MacKay Radio and
elegraph Company, 304 U.~~S . 333 (1938) .
subsequently found the act to be clearly constitutional, it
41is important to examine the objections. There were seven 
main objections: First, it was argued the act was lacking in
due process of law because it failed to accord proper proce­
dural safeguards against arbitrary administrative power and it 
compelled the employer to bargain against his will. It also 
forced reinstatement of striking employees without discrimina­
ting against those more actively engaged in strikes or other 
union activities. Secondly, it was asserted the act involved 
undue delegation of legislative power; that is to say, Congress 
gave too much discretionary and interpretive power to the 
National Labor Relations Board, and by so doing was delegating 
legislative power.
The third objection was that the act was an invasion 
of the power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution. However the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Education felt they had the authority to protect 
full freedom of organization and to prevent employer domina­
tion of employee organizations because they were trying to
promote industrial peace which in turn promoted the free flow
of commerce among the several states. They justified their 
claim by citing a case involving the Railway Labor Act of 1926.
Ludwig Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargain­
ing; (New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company, Inc., 1940), Vol. II,
p. 699.
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The case involved a railroad brotherhood which brought suit
i
to restrain the company from interfering with the rights of 
the employees to self-organization and designation of repre­
sentatives in violation of the Railway Labor Act of 1926. The 
Supreme Court compelled the company to;. (1) completely dises­
tablish its company union, (2) reinstate the Brotherhood, 
which was the recognized representative chosen by the majority 
of employees before the company began its interference, (3) 
restore to service and to certain privileges employees who 
have been discharged for activities on behalf of the Brother­
hood.^
The fact that jurisdictional strikes or any strikes 
burdened the flow of interstate commerce had been recognized
/ TZ
by the courts in several well-known cases. Chief Justice 
Taft said in the Coronado case, nXf Congress deems certain 
recurring practices, though not really part of interstate com­
merce, likely to obstruct, restrain, or burden it, it has the 
power to subject them to national supervision or restraint
42
Texas and New Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood 281,
U. S. 548 TI929}. ~ ~
43 .Duplex Printing Press Company v. Peering, 254 U. S.
443 (1921). American Steel Poundarles v. Tri-City Central Trades 
Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1922Y. CoroTiado Coal Company v. United 
Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925). Bedford Cut Stone Company 
v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. 37 (1927) .
^United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U. S. 
344 (1922)“ “  ~~ - -----  ---- ~
8 8
45This idea was also found m  several other cases.
The fourth objection was that the act interfered with 
the right of jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution, insofar as it permitted the award 
of back pay by an administrative agency. •
The fifth and sixth objections were that the act inter­
fered with the freedom of the press and freedom of speech, both 
violations of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The seventh and last objection was the broad defini­
tion given to the words "labor dispute." This rendered the act 
unconstitutional even assuming the act to be a valid congres­
sional power in interstate commerce. All of the above objec­
tions were made several times by lawyers representing the 
various employer groups.^
Even before the passage of the act on September 5,
1935, the National Lawyers7 Committee of the American Liberty 
League, an employer organization, declared the law unconstitu-
/ 7
tional so far as they were concerned. In the opinion of the 
45 .
Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 322 (1921). United States v. 
Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1921}. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 
262 U. S. 1 (1923). --------------- -----------------
46t
Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee 
on Education and Labor~ United States Senate, 74th Congress,
1st Session, Part 2, pp. 238-349.
47
National Labor Relations Board, First Annual Report,
1936, p. 46. ~------ ~~-----  “■
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Board, this did much to undermine the effectiveness of the law 
in its early days. The Board Stated:
During its first months, and before the Board 
had opportunity even to announce its procedures, 
an incident occurred which was to simulate injunc­
tion suits against the Board, and evfen to provide 
a sample brief for those wishing to attack the act. 
This was the publication by the National Lawyers’ 
Committee of the American Liberty League, on Sept­
ember 5, 1935, of a printed assault on the consti­
tutionality of the act. This document, widely 
publicized and distributed throughout the country 
immediately upon its issuance, did not present the 
argument in an impartial manner for the use of the 
attorneys. It was not a review of the cases which 
might be urged for and against the statute. It was 
not a brief in any case in court nor was it an 
opinion for any client involved in any case pending. 
Under the circumstances it can be regarded only as 
a deliberate and concentrated effort by a large 
group of well-known lawyers to undermine public 
confidence in the statute, to discourage compliance 
with it, to assist attorneys generally in attacks , 
on the statute, and perhaps to influence the courts.
The National Labor Relations Act was drafted to apply 
only to disputes concerning industries which affected inter­
state commerce. This was done for the obvious reason that 
Congress had jurisdiction only in this area and would not have 
any jurisdiction involving intrastate commerce. Section 2 (6 ) 
provided the following definition of the term "commerce:”
The term ’’commerce” means trade, traffic, 
commerce, transportation, or communication among 
the several States, or between the District of 
Columbia or any territory of the United States and 
any state or other territory, or between any foreign 
country and any State, Territory, or the District
48 .Ibid., p. 47.
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of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia 
or any Territory, or between points in the same 
State but through any other State or any Terri­
tory or the District of Columbia or any foreign 
country.49
Section 2 (7) of the act defines "affecting commerce11 
as follows:
The term "affecting commerce" means, in commerce, 
or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free 
flow of commerce, or having led or tending to 
lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing 
commerce or the free flow of commerce.50
It can be seen by the above provisions that the act 
contains no precise definition of the scope of interstate com­
merce. This was later recognized by the Supreme Court in 
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laugh!in Steel 
Corporation where the Court said;
Whether or not a particular activity does affect 
commerce in such a close and intimate fashion as 
to be subject to Federal control, and hence to lie 
within the authority conferred upon the Board, is 
left by the statute to be determined as individual 
cases arise.bi­
section 2 (1 ) provides that the term "person" includes 
one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corpora­
tions , legal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy, or
49United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress, 
Section 1, July 16, 1935.
50.r, . ,Ibid.
51 .National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Corporation, 301 U. S. 1 (1937X7
91
receivers." Section 2 (2) provides that "the term 'employer1 
includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, 
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States 
or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person 
subject to the Railway Act, as amended from time to time, or 
any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer)
or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
52 -labor organization." It is significant to note that Congress
included the word "association" in its definition of the term
"person." The Board has held subsequently that an employer
also includes employers 1 associations when the associations
have authority over the labor policies and problems of the
member emplo yers.^
"employee" includes any employee, that is, not limited to the 
employees of a particular employer. The report of the Senate 
Committee on Education and Labor set forth its reason for 
refusing to limit the term "employee" to the employees of a
Section 2 (3) of the act provides that the term
particular employer, as follows:
Under modern conditions employees at times 
organize along craft or industrial lines and fo; 
labor organizations that extend beyond the limi
52United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress, 
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
■^Williams Coal Comoany, 11 N. L. R. B. 579 (1939).
of a single employer unit. These organizations 
at times make agreements or bargain collectively 
with employers or with an association of employ­
ers. Through such business dealings, employees 
are at times brought into an economic relation­
ship with employers who are not their employers.54
The definition did not include any individual employed
" 5 5
as a farm laborer or as a domestic servant of any family.
It is important to remember that striking employees retained
their status as employees under the act in two situations:
first, where they struck in connection with a ’’current" labor
dispute**; secondly, where the strike was the result of an
unfair labor practice.
Section 2 (4) of the act provided that the term ’’repre-
• P C
sentative,r included any individual or labor organization.-^
In other words, the representative did not have to be an 
employee. An outside union might be chosen.
The National Labor Relations Act was passed and signed 
by President Roosevelt on July 5, 1935. It was called the 
t*Wagner-Gonnery Act** or more commonly, the ’Vagner Act.”^^
^^Hearings on National Labor Relations Board, Committee 
on Education and Labor, Report to Accompany Bill, United States 
Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, p. 302.
55 .United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress, 
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
~^ Ibid..
57J The American Labor,Legislation Review, Vol. 25, 
December, 1935, p. 33.
93
President-Roosevelt's message on signing the bill echoed the
hopes for all who worked for its passage. He said:
•..this Act defines, as a part of our substantive 
law, the right of self-organization of employees 
in industry for the purpose of collective bargain­
ing, and provides methods by which the Government 
can safeguard that legal right. It establishes 
a National Labor Relations Board to hear and deter­
mine cases in which it is charged that this legal 
right is abridged or denied, and to hold fair 
elections to ascertain who are the chosen repre­
sentatives of employees. A better relationship 
between labor and management is the high purpose 
of this Act. By assuring the employees the right 
of collective bargaining, it fosters the develop- 
ment of employment control on a sound and equitable 
basis. By providing an orderly procedure*for deter­
mining who is entitled to represent the employees, 
it aims to remove one of the chief causes of waste­
ful economic strife. By preventing practices which 
tend to destroy the independence of labor, it seeks, 
for every worker within its scope, that freedom of 
choice and action which is justly his.58.
CO
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(New York: Random House, 1938), Vol. IV, pp. 294-5.
CHAPTER IV
THE WAGNER ACT IN THE COURTS
The belief that the National Labor Relations Act was 
unconstitutional did much to discourage adherence to the law. 
Advised by their lawyers that the Supreme Court would most 
certainly invalidate it as going beyond the powers of Congress 
over interstate commerce, on which its provisions were based, 
anti-union employers did not hesitate to violate the law and 
instituted scores of injunctions to prevent the National Labor 
Relations Board from enforcing it.
The constitutionality of the Wagner Act was still 
undetermined as a new wave of unrest rose in the industrial 
world. By 1937, strikes rose to a peak even higher than 
that of 1934. They totaled 4,720 and almost two million work­
ers were involved. Auto workers at General Motors organized 
a dramatic sit-down strike.^ On April 12, 1937, the Supreme 
Court finally acted. In a series of decisions, of which the 
most important was that rendered in the case of National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, the law
2
was sustained. In this case, Chief Justice Hughes stated in
^Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1949), p. 279.
2National Labor Relations Board v . Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company, 301 U . S . 1 (1937).
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the five-to-four decision, ’’Employees have as clear a right 
to organize and select their representatives for lawful pur­
poses as the respondent has to organize its business and
3
select its own officers and agents.”
In the fight to prevent passage of the Wagner Act, the
4opposition listed seven constitutional objections. In due 
time, each objection was tested by the Supreme Court.
One of the leading arguments involved the question of 
whether the act failed to provide for safeguard against arbi­
trary administrative procedure and was, therefore, in viola­
tion of ’’due process of law.” This question was settled when 
the Supreme Court, in the Jones and Laughlin Steel Company case, 
said:
There must be complaint, notice, and hearing.
The Board must receive evidence and make findings.
The findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, 
but only if supported by evidence. The order of 
the Board is subject to review by the designated 
court. All questions of constitutional right or 
statutory authority are open to examination by the 
court. We construe the procedural provisions as 
affording adequate opportunity to secure judicial 
protection against arbitrary action in accordance 
with the well settled rules applicable to admini­
strative agencies set up by Congress to aid in the 
enforcement of valid legislation.^1
3Ibid.
4
See Chapter III, pages 8 6-8 8 .
5 .National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company, 301 U. S . 1 (1937) .
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The argument that the act violated the due process 
clause by directing an employer to bargain with his employees 
against his will was also found lacking* The Court said:
The Act does not compel agreements between 
employers and employees. Xt does not compel any 
agreement whatsoever. It does not prevent the 
employer from refusing to make a collective con­
tract and hiring individuals on whatever terms 
the employer may by unilateral action determine.°
The Court in the same decision also overturned the argu­
ment that due process of law was ignored by the act because it 
arbitrarily interfered with the employer*s right to hire and 
fire. The Court said:
The Act does not interfere with the normal 
exercise of the right of the employer to select 
its employees or to discharge them. The employer 
may not under cover of that right intimidate or 
coerce its employees with respect to their self- 
organization and representation, and, on the 
other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its 
authority a pretext for interference with the right 
of discharge when that right is exercised for other 
reasons than such intimidation and coercion.'7
The contention that the act involved undue delegation
of legislative power was answered by the Court in the Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corporation case simply with the words: '"The
o
Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform." ■
The Court did not explain the nature of the standards which 
the act establishes, but it is clear from a reading of the act 
that the Board is given no discretion in determining the
6Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
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existence or non-existence of wrongs other than those set 
down in the act. Specifically the jurisdiction of the Board 
is limited to the prevention of the unfair labor practices 
listed in the act, and to the certification of representation 
for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution pro­
vides that ffin suits of common law, where the value and contro­
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved.” Section 10 (c) of the act gives to the 
Board the power to order reinstatement of an employee and also 
the power to direct the employer to pay the wages for the 
unemployment caused by wrongful discharge. In the case of 
Jones, and Laughlin Steel Corporation, the plaintiff claimed 
this was unconstitutional because it deprived the employer the 
right to trial by. jury. The Court answered the contention in 
a twofold fashion: First, it was pointed out that the Seventh
Amendment did not apply to cases arising out of proceedings 
unknown to common law. Secondly, it was stated that ”the 
amendment is inapplicable to a case where recovery of money 
damages is an incident to equitable relief... either analogy 
could suffice to take Section 10 (c) of the Act out of the
9
vice of the Seventh Amendment. ”
The Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
reserves all powers not specifically granted to the Federal
9 Ibid.
Government to the States. The contention was raised in the 
Jones and Laughlin case that the entire act was Invalid becaus 
it invaded the States’ right to regulate local industry. The 
Court, however, pointed to Sections 2 (6) and 2 (7) of the act 
the first of which defined 11 commerce" and the second of which 
defined "affecting commerce." The jurisdiction of the act is 
limited to the prevention of unfair labor practices affecting 
interstate commerce, and congressional jurisdiction over inter 
state commerce was an unquestioned constitutional Federal 
power. It was also pointed out that if the Board involved 
itself in a dispute not affecting interstate commerce, the 
industry had remedy in the c our t s.^
It had been argued by the opponents of the bill that 
a firm engaged In simple manufacture was not engaged in inter­
state commerce even if it bought its materials from firms in 
other states and consequently sold Its finished product in 
other states. In a discussion of the Jones and Laughlin case, 
Professor Magruder pointed out that the company was organized
on a broad and national scale; it was impossible for the Court
11
not to consider it involved in interstate commerce.
10Ibid.
^Calvert Magruder, "A Half Century of Legal Influence 
Upon the Development of Collective Barga.ining," Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. go, (1936-7), p. 1092.
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The Court observed
When industries organize themselves on a 
national scale, making their relation to inter­
state commerce the dominant factor in their acti­
vities, how can it be maintained that their indus­
trial labor relations constitute a forbidden 
field into which Congress may not enter when it 
is necessary to protect interstate commerce from 
the paralyzing consequences of industrial war? 2
This interpretation would lead one to believe that all
business engaged in, that is, any type of buying or selling 
across state lines was subject to regulation. This was not 
the case. It is a matter of Court judgment as to whether the 
case involves a serious effect on interstate commerce. Pro­
fessor Magruder explains:
... the mere fact that a small concern obtains 
most of its raw materials from extrastate sources 
and sells most of its products to extrastate 
customers might not be enough, as in the case of a 
little factory manufacturing some unique but insig­
nificant gadget. A strike in such a factory might 
not be regarded as of ’’such urgent national concernn 
as to justify the application of Federal regulation, 
to production and activity intrastate in character 
when separately considered. 3-3
In the case of Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, a
somewhat hazy point of law was raised. The argument ran as 
follows: The plaintiff conceded Congress' right to regulate
interstate commerce when Congress attempted to remove actual
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughl: 
Steel Company, 301 U. S. 1 (1937) .
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obstruction to the channels of interstate commerce. But the 
use of Congressional power over interstate commerce as a means 
of regulating labor relations constituted the employment of 
a legitimate Congressional power for the purpose of exercising 
another power not belonging to Congress. In this case, the 
Court briefly stated that the act dealt with interstate com­
merce and was a legitimate power of Congress.^ In a later 
case, the Court made itself clear on this point when it said:
If industrial strife due to unfair labor prac­
tices actually brought about such a catastrophy, 
we suppose that no one would question the author­
ity of the Federal government to intervene in order 
to facilitate the settlement of the dispute and the 
resumption of the essential service to interstate 
and foreign commerce. But it cannot be maintained 
that the exertion of federal power must await the 
disruption of that commerce. Congress was entitled 
to provide reasonable preventive measures, and that 
was the object of the National Labor Relations A c t . ^
The question as to whether or not the act violated the
First Amendment regarding freedom of the press was brought up
in the case of the Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Board. In this case, the Associated Press fired one of its
rewrite men for union activity. The contention of the
14National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Company, 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
15Consolidated Edison Company v. National Labor Rela- 
tions Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938). '
16Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 
301 U. S. 103 C1937).
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Associated Press was that the National Labor Relations Board 
had no jurisdiction in the case because they had the protec­
tion of the First Amendment. The Court exploded the exaggera­
ted notion which the Press had on this point by saying: "The
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
17application of general laws.11 The Court felt that the
guarantee of freedom of the press has to do with liberty of
the publisher "to publish the news as it desires it published
or to enforce policies of its own choosing with respect to
18the editing and rewriting of news for publication." As Pro­
fessor Magruder said of this case: "The Constitution of the
United States has not guaranteed to publishers the right to
discharge an employee, even an editorial employee, because he
19has joined or been active in a labor organization."
time. Because the act obligated the employer to reinstate 
striking employees without discriminating against them, it was 
in violation of the due process of law clause where such obli-
The Court held in the case of National Labor Relations 
Board v. MacKay Radio and Telegraph Company that the guarantee
By 1938, a new contention was raised for the first
gation was sought to be fastened upon an employer guilty of 
no unfair labor practice prior to the calling of the strike
p. 1100-01
18Ibid
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of due process was not violated, since under the act striking 
employees retain their status as employees in the case where 
the strike is called as a result of an unfair labor practice 
by an employer, and also in the case where the strike is con­
nected with a current labor dispute, even though not caused’ 
by any unfair labor practice by the employer.
The respondent insists... that the relation of 
employer and employee ceased at the inception of 
the strike. The plain meaning of the Act is that 
if men strike in connection with a current labor 
dispute, their action is not to be construed as a 
renunciation of the employment relation and they 
remain employees for the remedial purposes speci­
fied in the Act. We have held that, in the exer­
cise of the commerce power, Congress may impose 
upon contractual relationships reasonable regula­
tions calculated to protect commerce against 
threatened industrial strife.20
The Board’s order, therefore, was sustained and required the
reinsbailment of the discharged employees.
The last constitutional question was whether the act
was unconstitutional because it interfered with the employer’s
right to state his views on the subject of unions; hence a
violation of the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of
speech. No challenge has been made that the act itself was
unconstitutional for this reason. The question has been raised
as to whether the Board *s interpretation was constitutional.
In at least one case the Board’s interpretation was overruled
20 National Labor Relations Board v. MacKay Radio and
Telegraph Company, 304 U . S . 333 Tl938).
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on this ground by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The fact 
that the act was found constitutionally acceptable in almost 
every way is apparent upon the close examination of the 
Supreme CourtTs opinion in the Jones and Laughlin Steel Com­
pany case. Professor Ludwig Teller said the act ’’was held 
constitutional outstandingly in the case of National Labor
22Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation...n
21National Labor Relations Board v . MacKay Radio and 
Telegraph Company, 304 U. S. 333 (1938).
22 . .
Ludwig Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargain
ing (New York: Baker Voorhis and Company, Inc., 1940), Vol. II 
p. 699.
CHAPTER V
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - A FACT
In order to appreciate the accomplishments and the 
constantly expanding scope of the National Labor Relations Act, 
it is necessary to examine some of the more important interpre­
tations of the act, made by the National Labor Relations Board 
in its daily application of the law. Section 8 declared the 
following to be unfair labor practices: (1) To interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in Section 7; (2 ) To dominate or interfere with the 
formation or administration of any labor organization or con- 
tribute financial or other support to it...; (3> By discrimi­
nation in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term 
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member­
ship in any labor organization....^
The first paragraph of Section 8 , which prohibits any 
restraint, coercion, or interference with the right of self- 
organization, was broad enough to embrace all other paragraphs 
of the section. An employer could not do anything to hinder 
or interfere with the right of his employees to organize. 
Neither he nor his agents could use violence against union
•^United States Statutes at Large, 74th Congress,
Session 1, July 16, 1935.
members. This was most clearly established in a 1939
2before the National Labor Relations Board.
An employer could not employ spies to report to
3on union activities. It was also determined that a threat
by an employer to shut down a plant or to move it to ■ another ■.
location in order to discourage organizational activities
a violation of Section 8 (1).^
The Board has held that in some instances the employer
must permit union agents to enter upon his property in order
to contact his employees, and he could not prohibit union
5 'solicitation upon his property outside of working hours. A 
wage Increase given by an employer to his employees was con­
sidered to be an unfair labor practice if there was any evi­
dence to indicate that his purpose might have been to discour­
age organizational activities.6
It was established that an employer was not permitted 
to engage in bribery to influence the attitude of his employees
toward a union or to coerce union officials. For example, it
^Dow Chemical Company, 13 N. L. R. B. 993 (1939).
^Agurlines, Inc., 2 N. L. R. B. 1 (1936).
^Triplett Electrical Instrument Company, 5 N. L. R. B. 
635 (1938).
^Seas Shipping Company, 4  N* L. R. B . 757 (1938).
^Indianapolis Power and Light Company, 25 N. L. R. B. 
163(194077
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was found to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
offer vacations with pay to employees who promised that in a
representational election they would vote against any outside
union. Another employer was found to have violated the law
by offering a union representative a good position ”... at a
8high salary provided he would desert the union.”
Section 8 (1) of the act, as it was applied by the 
Board, actually tended to limit the employer from making any 
comments about a union. Hence the employer claimed his free­
dom of speech was infringed upon. However it was limited only
to the extent that he could not use this freedom to coerce his
9
employees regarding union activities. The Board has said 
that the effect of an employer’s statements concerning a union 
is to be determined ”... by an evaluation of the natural conse' 
quences of such statements made not by one equal to another, 
but by an employer to those dependent upon it for their con­
tinued employment and livelihood. ,t^ ° The type of language 
used also had a bearing on whether or not the employer was in 
violation of the act. For example, the employer could not use
^McNeely and Price Company, 6 N. L. R. B. 800 (1937). 
^Carlisle Lumber Company, 2 N. L. R. B. 248 (1936).
9
See Chapter XV, page 102.
^Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, 17 N. L. R. B. 
69 (1939) .“  — ---- —  ----  ---
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such phrases as "cut throat" in describing a union.^ Further,
an employer was not permitted to tell his employees that the
union could do nothing to improve their conditions of employ- 
12ment. The Board also decided that any statement of employer 
preference for one of two rival unions was an act of coer-
13
cion. The Board has even held that an admittedly correct
statement about the employeesr rights under the National Labor
14Relations Act was a violation of Section 1.
The Supreme Court has held that for any statement of 
an employer to constitute a violation of the act, coercion 
must be evident either in the language used or in some of the 
surrounding circumstances. In the case of the Virginia Elec­
tric and Power Company, the employer had posted a bulletin, 
stating that it had been free from union organization for 
fifteen years. It went on to say: nThe Company recognizes 
the right of every employee to join any union that he may wish
to join, and such membership will not affect his position with 
15the Company." It added that no law required him to join
^Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. , 1 N. L. R. B. 503 (1936)
^Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, 17 N. L. R. B.
69 (1939).
^Continenta1 Box Company, 19 N. L. R. B. 860 (1940).
^4ock Gadson Voehbenger Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 133,
136 (1938)7 _  ■ _  -~ .........
Virginia Electric and Power Company, 20 N. L. R. B.
911, 920 (1940).
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any union. Concerning this bulletin, the Board said: ,TWe
find that by posting the Bulletin the respondent interfered 
with, restrained, and coerced his employees." But the 
Supreme Court held in an opinion written by Justice Murphy 
that the employer had the right to express his views on any 
side in an industrial controversy provided that no coercion 
was involved. He said:
If the total activities of an employer restrain 
or coerce his employees in their free choice, then 
those employees are entitled to the protection of 
the Act. And in determining whether a course of 
conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure 
exerted vocally by the employer may no more be dis­
regarded than pressure exerted in other ways.
Therefore, where the language used is not of itself coercive, 
the coercion can be inferred from the surrounding circum­
stances, but the Board must make a determination as to whether 
or not coercion has been exerted either through utterances 
made by the employer or for other reasons. In the Virginia 
Power Company case, the Court found that the utterances were 
not of themselves coercive, and since the Board did not relate 
them to their background, it found the act had not been vio­
lated. After this decision of the Supreme Court, the Board 
re-tried the case. In its second opinion it found that.the
^Ibid.
17 . . .Virginia Electric and Power Company v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 314 U. S. 469 (l94l).
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Bulletin previously mentioned, when considered along with cer­
tain anti-union activities of the Virginia Power Company and
several discriminatory discharges, constituted coercion and
18therefore violated the law. This decision was upheld by the 
Supreme Court which said: ,,While the Bulletin of April 26 and
the speeches of May 24 are still stressed, they are considered 
not in isolation but as a part of a pattern of events adding 
up to domination, interference, and coercion.^ Decisions 
such as the one discussed above have limited significance, 
since the Board is generally able to find the existence of 
coercion by considering employer statements in connection with 
his other actions.
The second provision of Section 8 prohibits interfer­
ence by an employer with the formation and administration of 
unions. The Board has said: "The formation and administra­
tion of labor organizations are the concern of the employees
20and not of the employers.n Thus it was designed as a prohi­
bition against the establishment of company dominated unions. 
The classic case involving the application of this section is 
that of the International Harvester Company. In this instance
•jo
Virginia Electric and Power Company, 44 N. L. R. B. 
404 (1942).
^ Virginia Electric and Power Company v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 319"U . S . 533, 539 (1943).
Of)Third Annual Report of the National Labor Relations 
Board (1938), p. 125.
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the employer had. established an industrial council plan, 
where representatives of the workers selected by members of 
the employees1 association met with representatives of manage­
ment to consider conditions of employment. The program was 
initiated by the employer, who financed both the industrial 
council and the employees1 association. The company urged 
all new employees to join the association. The council could 
not make a decision contrary to the wishes of the management.
This organization was, of course, found to be in violation of 
PIthe act.
Several years later the Board decided that it was a
violation of Section 8 (2) for an employee to be discharged
22because of his unwillingness to join an unaffiliated union.
This was for the obvious reason that a local unaffiliated 
union is much easier for an employer to dominate, and by simply 
encouraging such a union, in effect is tending to dominate it.
An employer was forbidden to give any positive assis­
tance to a labor organization; he was prohibited from drafting
■ 23
its constitution or from giving it any financial assistance.
21 •International Harvester Company, 2 N. L. R. B. 310, 
348 (1936).
22Titan Metal Manufacturing Company, 5 N. L. R. B.
577, 582 (1938).
23General Dry Batteries, Inc., 27 N. L. R. B.
102 (1940).
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Thus the employer Is prohibited from paying the wages of an
24employee who spends most of his time organizing a union*
The obvious reason for this is to prevent the employer from
dominating the actions of the union through influence brought
to bear on the union organizer.
The Board considered it to be immaterial that all the
members of the company dominated union joined it of their own
free will. Even though all the members joined the union with-
out any form of coercion or bribery, the attempted domination
25
was found to be illegal and the union disestablished. The 
act appears at first glance to prohibit only actual domination 
of a union by the employer, but the Board has interpreted this 
provision to constitute a prohibition against all attempted 
interference with a right to organize.
Section 8 (3) prohibits employers from discouraging or 
encouraging union membership by discriminating against union 
members. That is, an employer in hiring workers and in fixing 
the terms and tenure of employment, is forbidden to discrimi­
nate against an employee because he is a union member. A per­
son discharged because of union affiliation could be reinstated 
by order of the Board with back pay. Likewise, a refusal to 
hire a person because of union membership entitled that person
24Swift and Company, U N .  L. R. B. 809 (1939).
2~*Hicks Body Company, 33 N. L. R. B. 858 (1941).
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to a position with a discriminating employer with back pay 
from the time of refusal to hire. ^
The Board has decided that if several union leaders 
are the only employees discharged at a given time, an infer-
27ence could be drawn that the dismissals were discriminatory.
The same inference could be made if only employees active in
28the formation of a union were discharged at a given time.
The Board also decided an employee could not be discharged if
the employer alleged that he dismissed the employee because of
union activity and for other legitimate causes.. If at any
time the employer had given evidence of opposition to unions,
the Board would conclude the dismissal was due to union
activity, even though other good reasons for the discharge
existed, and there was no direct evidence that the action was
taken because of the employee's participation in union acti- 
29
vities. The Supreme Court later held this practice of the 
Board to be improper.^ If a discriminatory charge was alleged 
by the Board, however, and some evidence of union opposition 
had been presented, the employer then had the burden of
^°Phelps Dodge Company v. National Labor Relations 
Board, 313 U. S. 177 (1941). ” ~
^Arcadia Hosiery Company, 12 N. L. R. B. 467 (1939).
^Ross Packing Company, U  N. L. R. B. 934 (1939) .
^Hearst Consolidated Publications, 10 N. L. R. B.
1299; Arcade Sunshine Company, 12 N. L. R. B. 259 (1939).
^ N a t i o n a l  L a b o r  R e l a t i o n s  B o a r d  v .  S a n d s  M a n u f a c t u r i n g
C o m p a n y , 3 0 6  U .  S .  3 3 2  ( * 1 9 3 9 ) .
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proving that the discharge was not a consequence of union 
31activities.
Board decisions involving Section 8 (3) made it quite
difficult for an employer to discipline his workmen who
refused to obey orders. Employees could not be forced to take 
a job formerly held by a union official who had been dis­
charged. This refusal to work was considered to be a union 
activity, and to discharge a worker for refusal to work in
such an instance constituted discrimination against the employ-
. - . ' 32ees because of their union membership. Employees could not
be discharged for threatening to strike to secure the discharge
33of an unpopular foreman.
An employer could be easily injured by inter-union 
warfare carried on by workers in his plant. For example, in a 
plant with two conflicting unions it would be a violation of 
Section 8 (3) for the employer to discharge members of a union 
involved in a jurisdictional strike in order to end the strike, 
even if the members of the other union continued to work.5^
^Reliance Manufacturing Company v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 125 Fed. (2d) 311 (1941).
^Niles Fire Brick Company, 30 N. L. R. B. 426 (1941) .
3 3
Pittsburgh Standard Envelope Company, 20 N. L. R. B. 
516 (1940).
34National Labor Relations Board v. Star Publishing
Company, 97 Fed. (2df) 465'^1938) .
114
The problem of jurisdictional strikes caused by rival union­
ism was a very real problem to some employers. If the act 
created a problem for the employer, however, it can be 
observed by close study of the National Labor Relations Board 
decisions that the act was doing an efficient job of solving 
the union problem of employer interference in organizational 
attempts by employees. If any conclusion can be drawn from a 
study of the Board decisions, it is that the Board tended to 
interpret the act very broadly and became more effective in 
enforcing the principles of the act than even the drafters of 
the law could have anticipated.
An indication of the activity of the National Labor 
Relations Board can be gained by examination of the following 
statistics. During the period from 1936 to 1947, the Wagner 
Act years, the National Labor Relations Board was called upon 
to determine representatives for collective bargaining in 
36,969 cases. Labor unions won lawful bargaining rights in 
30,110 instances, and workers voted for ”no union” in 6,859 
cases. Slightly more than nine million workers were eligible 
to vote in representational elections. Of this total,
7,677,135 workers, 84 per cent, actually cast ballots. Votes
cast for labor unions amounted to 6,145,834 and votes against
3 5
unions numbered 1,531,301. These figures indicate the act 
3 5
Twelfth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations 
Board (1947) , p. 125.
115
was successful in establishing an orderly manner for the selec­
tion of bargaining representatives. The law substituted the 
ballot box for industrial warfare. Workers in free elections 
were given the opportunity of selecting or rejecting the pro­
cess of collective bargaining. The act established the 
principle of representative democracy in the nation's indus­
trial life.
The number of organizational strikes that took place 
following the passage of the act is one standard to evaluate 
the results of the National Labor Relations Act. Approxi­
mately fifty per cent of all strikes which occurred during 
the 1934-36 period resulted from organizational disputes.
These strikes involved about forty-three per cent of the
3 5workers who engaged in all strikes during this period. In 
comparison, in 1942, the first full year of World War II, 
organizational controversies caused only 31.2 per cent of all 
strikes. In subsequent war years, the organizational strike 
was even of less importance. In 1943 organizational disputes 
resulted in 15.7 per cent of all work stoppages; in 1944 they 
caused 16.3 per cent of all strikes; and in 1945 organizational 
disputes caused 20.5 per cent of all work stoppages. From the 
point of view of the number of workers engaged in strikes 
during the war years (1942-1945), work stoppages carried out
^^fonthly Labor Review, Vol. 42, p. 162; and Vol. 44,
p. 1230.
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for organizational purposes involved about 18.5 per cent of
3 7
all workers engaged in strikes during this period. In the 
light of the organizational strike experience during the 
1934-1936 period, it seems likely that in the absence of the 
effective operation of the National Labor Relations Act, 
organizational strikes would have been of greater comparative 
importance during World War II.
A comparison of the frequency of organizational 
strikes which took place during World War I with those which 
occurred in World War II might further indicate the extent to 
which the National Labor Relations Act succeeded in decreas­
ing such work stoppages in the World War II years. During 
World War I , when there existed no agency similar to the 
National Labor Relations Board, it was reported that 314 
strikes were caused by employers’ refusal to recognize unions 
in 1917, and 221 such strikes took place in 1918. Expressed 
in a different way, recognitional strikes caused approximately 
7 per cent of all the strikes in 1917 and about 6.5 per cent 
in 1918. On the other hand, in 1942, the first full year of
World War II, only 169 recognitional strikes occurred and they
38accounted for only 5.6 per cent of all 1942 strikes.
The success of the act in decreasing the number of 
organizational strikes cannot be denied. The trend during
3 7Ibid., Vol. 56, p. 973. 38,. • ,Ibid..
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World War II removed all doubt on the issue. Some people, 
however, contended that the act, though decreasing the number 
of organizational strikes, stimulated strikes for such 
non-organizational issues as wages, hours, pensions, vacations, 
and the like. Their argument ran along the following lines. 
Under the protection of the National Labor Relations Act, 
union membership increased, the union movement expanded into 
new areas, and union bargaining strength sharply increased. 
These circumstances increased the number of strikes for work 
and wage improvements. Unions became a much more powerful 
inf luence in our society and could make more demands, and 
strike to achieve these demands. Hence the act did not 
promote industrial peace. This argument, when closely ana­
lyzed, does not prove the act to be defective in any way. The 
act was not intended to do away with all types of strikes. It 
was enacted to reduce the number of organizational strikes and 
to encourage the growth of labor organizations for the purpose 
of collective bargaining. This it admittedly did. It is not 
fair to evaluate the National Labor Relations Act on the basis 
of the number of overall strikes arising during its operation. 
The only valid basis for evaluating its contribution to indus­
trial peace is in the area of organizational strikes.
It is quite clear that the National Labor Relations 
Act did stimulate the growth of labor unions, which, it must 
be remembered, was one of the purposes of the act. Union
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membership increased from, four million in 1935 to about six-
39teen million in 1947. Under the protection of the act, the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations was able to organize the 
mass production industries on an industry-wide basis. The 
American Federation of Labor likewise undertook extensive 
organizational activities. Obviously, the Wagner Act accomp­
lished its objectives of promoting collective bargaining. One 
might draw this conclusion from the many objections raised to 
the act, and the extreme hostility to the act exhibited by 
the enemies of trade unionism. One may disagree as to whether 
or not a large or small union movement is good or bad for 
society, the fact remains that during the period of the act 
labor unions grew in size and in power.
Other results of the National Labor Relations. Act are 
possibly of greater significance. The act operated to increase 
the number of effective collective bargaining agreements. In 
1946 the number of collective bargaining contracts in the 
nation totaled well over 50,000. In addition, during each 
year these contracts were re-written and re-signed in whole or
in part. This was an increase of over 100 per cent in less
40than a ten year period. These figures indicate that indus­
trial peace and not industrial warfare was the result of the 
collective bargaining process. By far the vast majority of
4 0 Ibid.
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labor contracts were negotiated and signed without resort 
to the strike. Critics who found fault with the act for 
having given labor unions the ability to organize themselves 
and thereby achieving the economic power to strike in order 
to enforce their demands, either must choose to weaken the 
union, thereby making it impossible to strike, or must find 
some other methods of settling the dispute, such as govern­
mental intervention or compulsory arbitration. This is still 
one of the thorny problems of our society.
It is noteworthy that the act stimulated such a great 
growth in the number of collective bargaining agreements. 
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that these contracts, 
once executed, provide the basis for peaceful and industrial 
relations for many years. Perhaps the biggest hurdle to 
industrial peace is the negotiation of the first collective 
bargaining contract between a particular union and company.
There is some reason to believe that the attitude of 
employers towards collective bargaining became more favorable 
during the National Labor Relations Act years. Some employers, 
of course, were forced into the collective bargaining process 
against their will. Many of them may not have found the 
experience as terrible as they might have expected it to be. 
Contacts with the unions, their leaders, and their techniques 
undoubtedly influenced some employers to change their point 
of view on the issue. In any event, the general attitude
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of employers since the passage of the National Labor Relations 
Act have tended to be more broad-minded concerning union acti­
vities. Employers have come to recognize that unions in their 
collective bargaining process are here to stay, and that it is 
not an evil change, but actually quite a healthy one. The pre 
vailing attitude of the more liberal employer today seems to 
be that bargaining between management and labor on an equal 
power basis is a desirable method of determining the share 
which each element of our society should have of total pro­
duction.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The American workingman’s right to organize and bar­
gain collectively was disputed for well over a century. In 
the early 19th Century, the courts, both state and federal, 
used the old conspiracy doctrine holding that the labor groups 
were in restraint of trade. In mid-century, in the case of 
Commonwealth v. Hunt, the use of this doctrine was immediately 
halted when a Massachusetts judge decided that a conspiracy 
could not be ’’criminal” unless the conspirators were plotting 
an illegal act. Within a few years the use of this doctrine 
to discourage union organization all but dis appeared.
Again the courts posed a threat to the union movement. 
The courts decided under common law that certain kinds of 
contracts and agreements were illegal because they tended to 
restrain trade and create a monopoly. In conjunction with 
this concept, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 was used to 
discourage union organization and activity.
An attempt was made in 1914 to exclude labor organi­
zations from the anti-trust laws and exempt them from the 
court injunction used to prohibit certain union activities. 
However, because of conservative court decisions, this attempt 
failed.
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The Norris-La Guardia Act, a forerunner of the New 
Deal legislation in this field, was the first significant 
advance made by labor. The use of the injunction was limited 
and the "yellow dogn contract was made unenforceable.
In an attempt to provide further aid to labor organi­
zations , Senator Wagner and his followers passed certain 
experimental legislation in the form of the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act and Public Resolution Number 44. This was 
thwarted both by the Supreme Court and the general unwilling­
ness of the business community to abide by the legislation.
The National Labor Relations Act was the culmination 
of the gradual development of a favorable national policy 
towards collective bargaining. Along with the Norris- 
La Guardia; Act and Section 7(a) of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, the law served to encourage the expansion of 
the collective bargaining process and industrial unionism. 
Whereas the Norris-La Guardia Act prohibited the courts from 
taking sides in labor disputes, the National Labor Relations 
Act denied employers the opportunity to utilize their superior 
economic strength to contain and to destroy unionism. The 
fact that both acts succeeded is evidenced in the remarkable 
gains made by organized labor during the 1932-1947 period. 
Basically, the standard of evaluation of these two acts rests 
upon the merits of the collective bargaining process. Those
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who feel that a strong labor movement, not a weak one, serves 
the public interest will find much to praise in these laws. 
Conversely, those who feel a weak, inept movement is in the 
interest of society will find much to criticize in these laws. 
Suffice to say that these laws had a tremendous influence on 
the balance between labor and management, and also, in a more 
indirect way, on the general economic structure of the nation.
Labor unions are the collective bargaining agencies. 
The process of collective bargaining does not exist apart from 
the trade union. Weakening of the union movement in the 
collective bargaining area would diminish the scope and inten­
sity of the collective bargaining process. Both the Norris- 
La Guardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act rested 
upon the fundamental proposition that legal support was 
imperative for the effective operation of trade unionism and 
collective bargaining. The direction of public sentiment has 
been one of approval of the collective bargaining process 
from the earliest conspiracy case of 1806 to the enactment of 
the National Labor Relations Act. When the courts in early 
times frustrated the development and functioning of unionism, 
the legislative branch, sensitive to public opinion, took 
corrective action. When the courts again interfered with the 
activities of labor by diluting the legislation through inter­
pretive methods * the legislatures , again because of public
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sentiment, remedied the situation by legislative action. The 
public, through its legislature, showed its approval of the 
collective bargaining process with the passage of the Norris- 
La Guardia Act, Section 7 (a), and the National Labor Rela­
tions Act. These laws represented society*s desire to esta­
blish a legal framework which would be conducive to the 
collective bargaining process.
Indeed, the growth of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining between the 1932-1946 period, along with the 
achievement of respectability by unions, was nothing short of 
being a cataclysmic change.
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APPENDIX
MOHAWK VALLEY FORMULA
First:
Second:
Third:
Fourth:
When a strike is threatened, label the union leaders 
as ’’agitators” to discredit them with the public and 
their own followers. In the plant, conduct a forced 
balloting under the direction of foremen in an 
attempt to ascertain the strength of the union and 
to make possible misrepresentation of the strikes 
as a small minority imposing their will upon the 
majority. At the same time, disseminate propaganda 
by means of press releases, advertisements, and the 
activities of ’’missionaries,” such propaganda 
falsely stating the issues involved in the strike 
so that the strikers appear to be making arbitrary 
demands, and the real issues, such as the employer’s 
refusal to bargain collectively, are obscured. 
Concurrently with these moves, by exerting economic 
pressure through threats to move the plant, align 
the influential members of the community into a 
cohesive group opposed to the strike. Include in 
this group, usually designated a ’’citizens commit­
tee,” representatives of the bankers, real-estate 
owners, and business men, i.e., those most sensi­
tive to any threat of removal of the plant because 
of its effect upon property values and purchasing
power flowing from payrolls.
When the strike is called, raise high the banner of 
’’law and order,” therby causing the community to 
mass legal and police weapons against a wholly 
imagined violence and to forget that those of its 
members who are employees have equal rights with the 
other members of the community.
Call a ’’mass meeting” of the citizens to co-ordinate 
public sentiment against the strike and to streng­
then th e power of the citizens * committee, which 
organization, thus supported, will both aid the
employer in exerting pressure upon the local author­
ities and itself sponsor vigilante activities.
Bring about the formation of a large armed police 
force to intimidate tie strikers and to exert a 
psychological effect upon the citizens. This force 
is built up by utilizing local police, state police, 
if the governor co-cpznates, vigilantes, and special 
deputies, the deputies being chosen if possible from
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other neighborhoods, so that there will be no per­
sonal relationships to induce sympathy for the 
strikers. Coach the deputies and vigilantes on 
the law of unlawful assembly, inciting to riot, 
disorderly conduct, e t c s o  that, unhampered by 
any thought that the strikers may also possess 
some rights, they will be ready and anxious to 
use their newly acquired authority to the limit.
Fifth: And perhaps most important, heighten the demora­
lizing effect of the above measures--all designed 
to convince the strikers that their cause is hope- 
less— by a "back-to-work" movement, operated by a 
puppet association of so-called "loyal emplo5?ees" 
secretly organized by the employer. Have this 
association wage a publicity campaign in its own 
name and co-ordinate such campaign with the work 
of the "missionaries" circulating among the strikers 
and visiting their homes. This "back-to-work" 
movement has these results: It causes the public
to believe that the strikers are in the minority 
and that most of the employees desire to return to 
work, thereby winning sympathy for the employer 
and an endorsement of his activities to such an 
extent that the public is willing to pay the huge 
costs, direct or indirect, resulting from the 
heavy forces of police. This "back-to-work" move­
ment also enables the employer, when the plant is 
later opened, to operate it with strike-breakers 
if necessary and to continue to refuse to bargain 
collective^ with the strikers. In addition, the 
"back-to-work" movement also enables the employer 
to keep a constant check on the strength of the 
union through the number of applications received 
from, the employees ready to break ranks and return 
to work, such number being kept a secret from the 
public and the other employees so that the doubts 
and fears created by such secrecy will in turn 
induce still others to make applications.
Sixth: When a sufficient number of applications are on hand,
fix a date for an opening of the plant through the 
device of having such opening requested by the "back- 
to-work" association. Together with the citizens * 
committee, prepare for such opening by making provi­
sion for a peak army of police, by roping off the 
areas surrounding the plant, by securing arms and 
ammunition, etc. The purpose of the "opening" of
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the plant is 'three-fold,; to see if enough employees 
are ready to return to work; to induce still others 
to return as a result of the demoralizing effect 
produced by the opening of the plant and the return 
of some of their number; and lastly, even if the 
maneuver fails to induce a sufficient number of 
persons to return, to persuade the public through 
pictures and news releases that the opening was 
nevertheless successful.
Seventh: Stage the ’’opening” theatrically, throwing open
the gates at the propitious moment and having the 
employees march into the plant grounds in a massed 
group protected by squads of armed police so as to 
give to the opening a dramatic and exaggerated 
quality and thus heighten its demoralizing effect. 
Along with the ’’opening” provide a spectacle—  
speeches, flag-raising, and praises for the employees, 
citizens, and local authorities, so that, their 
vanity touched, they will feel responsible for the 
continued success of the scheme and will increase 
their efforts to induce additional employees to 
return to work.
Eighth: Capitalize on the demoralization of the strikers
by continuing the show of police force and the pres­
sure of the citizens* committee, both to insure that 
those employees who have returned will continue at 
work and to force the remaining strikers to capitu­
late. If necessary, turn the locality into a war­
like camp through the declaration of a state of 
emergency tantamount to martial law and barricade 
it from the outside world so that nothing may inter­
fere with the successful conclusion of the ’’formula,” 
thereby driving home to the union leaders the futil-. 
ity of further efforts to hold their ranks intact.
Ninth: Close the publicity barrage, which day by day during
the entire period has increased the demoralization 
worked by all of these measures, on the theme that 
the plant is in full operation and that the strikers 
were merely a minority attempting to interfere with 
the ’’right to work,” thus inducing the public to 
place a moral stamp of approval upon the above mea­
sures. With this, the campaign is over— the employer 
has broken the strike.
